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Investment in Small Hydropower Plants Under Uncertainty
by Maria Tandberg Nyg˚ard
Investment in renewable energy production in Norway is since the 1st of January
2012 granted subsidies through a market for elcertificates common with Sweden.
The underlying purpose is to reach the Norwegian and Swedish government’s goal
of adding 26.4 TWh of renewable generation capacity within 2020. This thesis
considers how the introduction of elcertificates has affected the expectations of
investors investing in small hydropower plants in Norway. Data from 214 licenses
granted from 2001 including 2008 are used to replicate the investor’s decision
problem. By taking a real options approach, investment timing and uncertainty
in electricity and subsidy prices are considered. Solving for the required sub-
sidy level for investment to be optimal, one can study the implicit expectation
towards the elcertificates at the realized timing of investment. The analytical so-
lution shows that the average investor expected subsidies in line with prices in the
Swedish elcertificate market according to the optimal decision rule. Additionally,
real options theory seems to better explain investment behaviour compared to the
NPV rule, as investors were found to respond to subsidy uncertainty according to
our predictions.
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Sivilingeniør
Investering i sm˚akraftverk under usikkerhet
av Maria Tandberg Nyg˚ard
Investering i fornybar energi i Norge har siden 1. Januar 2012 blitt tildelt subsidier
gjennom et felles marked for elsertifikater med Sverige. Hensikten er a˚ tilføre 26.4
TWh ny fornybar energi innen 2020, et ma˚l satt av den norske og svenske reg-
jeringen i fellesskap. Denne masteroppgaven omhandler effekten introduseringen
har hatt p˚a forventningene og investeringsoppførselen til sma˚kraftinvestorer. Data
fra 214 lisenser tildelt i tidsrommet 2001–2008 er brukt til a˚ replikere investorens
beslutningsgrunnlag. Ved a˚ bruke en realopsjonsmodell tar vi hensyn til b˚ade valg
av investeringstidspunkt og usikkerhet i forhold til inntekter fra salg av strøm og
elsertifikater. Løser vi for subsidieniv˚aet som gjør det lønnsomt a˚ investere, kan vi
studere den implisitte forventningen til subsidier ved faktisk investeringstidspunkt.
Den analytiske løsningen viser at investorene forventet subsidier p˚a størrelse med
de svenske elsertifikatene ifølge den optimale beslutningsregelen. I tillegg finner
vi at realopsjonsteori gir en bedre forklaring av investeringsoppførselen enn NPV,
da investorene responderte p˚a usikkerheten som forespeilet.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis, 214 licenses to build small hydropower plants in Norway are ex-
amined. Knowing whether an investment decision for each license was made and
when, we can by use of a real options model try to infer if the investors believed
they would receive subsidies through elcertificates, or not. We do this by backing
out the implied expectations to elcertificates at the time of investment assuming
the investor follows the optimal decision rule in real options theory. As some in-
vestors might view the license as a now-or-never opportunity, we will in addition
calculate the implied subsidy using the net present value (NPV) rule. We will
compare the results and discuss which model seems to best represent the data.
Investment in small hydropower plants is in a special position, along with invest-
ments in wind power, because there has been political discussions about subsi-
dies since 2001. Small hydropower plants are characterized by a maximum in-
stalled power of 10MW. The though was initially that the subsidies would be
given through a market for elcertificates common for Norway and Sweden, but
it was not before 2011 that the subsidies were passed by law in Norway. The
market in Sweden was up and running from May 2003. The subsidies are a re-
sponse to the EU directives 2001/77/EC and 2009/28/EC promoting the use of
renewable energy sources, where only the latter was binding for the Norwegian
government. In 2010, it materialized in an agreement between the governments in
Sweden and Norway committing to increase the amount of new renewable energy
with 26.4 TWh within 2020 using a common market for elcertificates (Ministry of
Petroleum and Energy, 2010). By investigating licenses granted between 2001 and
2008 we precede the introduction of this market in Norway, which did not become
1
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active before 1st January 2012. The motivation for a common market, instead
of two separate, was to achieve a more cost-efficient development through higher
liquidity, lower price volatility and lower political risk.
All those years of political discussion led to policy uncertainty for the investors.
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) state that ”If governments wish to stimulate investments,
perhaps the worst thing they can do is to spend a long time discussing the right
way to do so.”. Addressing this, the Minister of Petroleum and Energy promised
a transitional agreement in a press release stating that all who invested after 1st
January 2004 would be included in the subsidy scheme when introduced (Ministry
of Petroleum and Energy, 2003). However, a few years later negotiations with
Sweden broke down. In December 2007 negotiations were revitalized and in 2009
a second transitional agreement was promised by the Minister of Petroleum and
Energy. Then, only plants built after 7th September 2009 would be subject to
elcertificates.
During this period, investors in Norway had varying expectations to whether they
would receive subsidies or not. Some were sitting on the fence waiting for a final
confirmation, others invested knowing that their projects would be profitable re-
gardless of any subsidy scheme. Others again invested believing they would receive
subsidies based on the promised transitional arrangement. The goal of this thesis
is to try to infer whether the investors who made an investment decision expected
revenue from subsidies and if they responded to the uncertainty as predicted by
theory.
To model the investment decision a real options model inspired by Boomsma and
Linnerud (2013) is used. Using a real options model, we are able to incorporate
uncertainties with respect to revenue and investment timing. We are also able to
account for the value of waiting for more information. Both the price of electricity
and the price of elcertificates are taken as stochastic, resulting in a two-factor
model. The investment cost is modelled as constant and constitutes a sunk cost
once the investment decision is made, as the investment decision is irreversible.
The solution to the model has one degree of freedom, and can therefore only be
solved by specifying one of the variables. We have chosen to specify the electricity
price, making it possible to solve for the required subsidy level for investment to
be optimal.
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Even though few investors have heard about real options theory, it is not said
that they do not behave accordingly. Over time, investors can develop their own
decision rules which are similar to what predicted by theory. Kellogg (2010) state
that real options is consistent with the existence of a strong incentive for firms
to behave optimally. He finds that the cost of failing to respond to changes in
volatility can be substantial. Thus, there are good motivation for taking a real
options approach.
Real options theory start with Merton (1973) and Black and Scholes (1973) who
were the first to link the financial options theory to decision making. McDonald
and Siegel (1986) further described the value of waiting to invest in irreversible
projects. There are mainly two methods in evaluating a real option (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994). The most common is the contingent claim analysis, which makes
use of a replicating portfolio creating a risk-neutral investment. The other, is the
dynamic programming method solved recursively. Dynamic programming is the
choice of model here because it is impossible for a power producer to completely
mitigate the risk, as revenue is depending on precipitation. Also, a market for
elcertificate risk does not exist and entering bilateral agreement for the whole
production would become very expensive. Thus, creating a replicating portfolio
causes difficulties, even though it could be done by estimating an endogenous
discount rate.
Limitations to the dynamic programming approach is the assumption of time
consistency, that the investor has no incentive to deviate from the strategy that was
calculated by the model before any decisions are actually made. This is called an ex
ante approach and is closely connected to the assumption that decision makers are
expected utility maximizers through the linearity properties of expectations. Rust
(2006) points out that ”the linearity property of expected utility appears to be a
key property that is violated in numerous experimental studies that have found
that human decision making under uncertainty is inconsistent with expected utility
maximization.”. Thus, dynamic programming will not always find the correct
solution.
There are developed numerous applications of real options to the energy industry.
Tourinho (1979) examines the option to wait in valuing natural resources. Brennan
and Schwartz (1985) also use real options theory to evaluate natural resource
investments and stresses the importance of treating output prices as stochastic
when price swings are high. This is particularly the case for many natural resource
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industries, including electricity. Fernandes et al. (2011) give a summary of all
papers involving real options theory applied to renewable energy resources.
Previous work on policy uncertainty include amongst others Rodrik (1991), Mauer
and Ott (1995) and Hassett and Metcalf (1999) who examine investor behaviour
under an uncertain reform or tax law change. Blyth et al. (2007), Yang et al. (2008)
and EIA (2007) discuss policy uncertainty with respect to climate policy and its
implications for the choice of power producing technology. These studies generally
find that uncertainty act as a hefty tax on investment or as a risk premium for
investors. Boomsma et al. (2012) analyse investment timing and capacity choice for
renewable energy projects under different support schemes, namely feed-in-tariffs
and renewable energy certificate trading. The approach is a three-factor contingent
claim analysis used on a wind power case study. Adkins and Paxson (2013) derive
the optimal investment timing and real option value for a renewable energy facility
with price and quantity uncertainty, where there might be a government subsidy
proportional to the quantity of production. Boomsma and Linnerud (2013) analyse
the risk of a switch from the current support scheme at some random future point in
time, using a case study for an onshore wind power project. Applying a two-factor
model, they have the ability to model the support scheme as either price-driven
(fixed price premium) or quantitative-driven (stochastic price premium).
The real options model in this thesis is applied to high quality data obtained from
the regulatory database which is verified or updated through interviews. The
dataset was originally gathered in 2011 and used by Heggedal et al. (2013). It
is updated and extended by contacting the license holders that did not respond
previously or had not made a decision to investment in 2011. The overall response
rate is 99% (211 of 214 plants).
Empirical research on real options began with Paddock et al. (1988), Quigg (1993),
and Moel and Tufano (2002). They all find empirical support for a model that
incorporates the option to wait. Case studies on real options in the Nordic elec-
tricity market include Bøckman et al. (2008), Fleten et al. (2007) and Fleten and
Ringen (2009), where the first focus on investment timing and optimal capacity
choice for small hydropower projects.
The work closest related to this thesis is Heggedal et al. (2013) and Gravdehaug
and Remmen (2011). Both applied a real options model to empirical data on
licenses to build small hydropower plants in Norway and investigated whether
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policy uncertainty affected the timing of investment. Gravdehaug and Remmen
(2011) had a smaller data set, with 74 licenses compared to 214. Both take the
amount of subsidies and the electricity price as uncertain, but while Heggedal
et al. (2013) and this thesis model revenue using Geometric Brownian motion
(GBM), Gravdehaug and Remmen (2011) modeled it as Arithmetic Brownian
motion (ABM). The solution in Heggedal et al. (2013) is found by simulation
through least squares Monte Carlo, while Gravdehaug and Remmen (2011) reduces
the two-factor model to a one-factor, as the first order homogeneous PDE for a
two-factor problem has a known solution (McDonald and Siegel, 1986). This thesis
thereby extend this area of research by applying an analytical solution to the two-
factor investor’s decision problem.
The main contribution of this thesis is that it is an empirical study in the stream
of theoretical and case-study based papers on multi-factor real options models
with Geometric Brownian motion diffusion processes. It follows recent progress in
analytical and quasi-analytical solution methods by Gahungu and Smeers (2009),
Rohlfs and Madlener (2011), Adkins and Paxson (2011) and Boomsma and Lin-
nerud (2013). Also, to the best of our knowledge, few empirical studies have
been conducted on investors’ expectations under policy uncertainty. This contri-
bution applies wider than just small hydropower plants, and could lead to insights
in investment expectations under policy uncertainty with regards to all kinds of
subsidies, not just elcertificates.
As the value of power plants is not available publicly, we do not completely know
the firm’s objective function and investor preferences. We therefore assume that
the investor has rational expectations. The theories by Tversky and Kahneman
(1975) on bounded rationality in behavioural economics explain why investor some-
times behave irrationally. They explain irrational behaviour with three heuristics
that are commonly employed in judgement under uncertainty: i) assessment of
representativeness, ii) assessment of availability and iii) adjustment from a start-
ing point. Knowing that these heuristics are commonly employed, the assumption
that investors are rational could affect our results. The method of structural
estimation combats these pitfalls. Strebulaev and Whited (2012) claim that es-
timating structural models is useful because the connection between theory and
tests of theory is extremely tight, thereby allowing a transparent interpretation of
any result. Kellogg (2010) explain this further by stating ”The use of this model
allows me to do more than carry out a simple “yes/no” test of whether or not firms
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respond to changes in expected oil price volatility: I can also compare the magni-
tude of firms’ responses in the data to the magnitude prescribed by the model.”.
There are mainly two approaches to structural estimation: Nested Fixed Point Al-
gorithm (NFXP) (Rust, 1987) and Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium
Constraints (MPEC) (Su and Judd, 2012). It is applied to real options theory in
amongst others Morellec et al. (2008), Muehlenbachs (2009) and Kellogg (2010).
Although a structural estimation approach would most likely improve our result,
it is not applied here as it is outside of the scope of this thesis.
Throughout this thesis, the terms elcertificates, electricity certificates, green cer-
tificates, certificates and subsidies will be used all meaning the same. Readers
must not make the mistake of misinterpreting the Guarantees of Origin as an el-
certificate. A Guarantee of Origin is also traded in the market, but its purpose is
merely as evidence to customers of the quality of the delivered electricity.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explain the purpose and mechanism
behind elcertificates. Chapter 3 describe the investor’s decision problem and the
model using the real options framework. Chapter 4 present the data set and
describe main findings. In Chapter 5, results from the real options model are
discussed and Chapter 6 concludes.
Chapter 2
Elcertificates
This chapter focuses on describing the elcertificate as a policy instrument and the
background for its existence. First, a review of the history behind the introduction
of elcertificates will be given in Section 2.1. This will be followed by a description of
the price determination and the market mechanisms in Section 2.2. Implications of
the scheme for different types of renewable energy sources are discussed in Section
2.3.
2.1 The New Renewable Energy Target
As part of the EU directives 2009/28/EC and 2001/77/EC, Norway’s and Swe-
den’s governments have agreed to increase their countries overall renewable power
production by 26.4 TWh within 2020. Put in perspective, the amount equals more
than half of the current consumption for all Norwegian households (NVE, 2012).
The increased production will be split equally when reporting to EU on the re-
newable targets. The elcertificates are introduced to address this goal by giving
an economic incentive for investment. Jensen and Skytte (2003) found that it is
always optimal to reach a renewable energy deployment goal by the use of green
certificates.
A common market for elcertificates is now in place, but it has taken many years to
get there. The market for elcertificates was established in Sweden May 2003. As
from the beginning in 2001, the intention was that the market was to be common
for Norway and Sweden. Negotiations broke down and consequently the market
7
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only included Sweden for many years. Subsequently, Norwegian legislators dis-
cussed not only subsidies through certificates, but alternatively a feed-in-premium
in 2007. This was abandoned in 2008, as negotiations with Sweden were revital-
ized. A common market was finally determined in 2009, with start-up in 2012.
As of 1st January 2012, Norwegian power producers and distributors have joined
in and a common market is formed. A summary of publicly available information
published by the Norwegian government during this period is presented in Table
2.1. It is reasonable to assume that investors were familiar with these statements.
But who is included in this subsidy scheme? All producers of new renewable
energy are eligible to receive elcertificates, as long as they invest within a certain
time frame. In Norway, all owners of hydropower plants who invest in new or
upgraded capacity with initial building start after 1st January 2012, and before
the end of 2020, are eligible. The investors will receive certificates throughout 15
years. In addition, some investors who invested prior to 2012 are subject to a
transitional arrangement. For them, the number of years in operation before 2012
will be subtracted from the lifetime of the subsidies. The original transitional
arrangement promised subsidies to plants built after 1st January 2004. However,
in 2009 they reversed this, and the date was postponed to 7th September 2009. A
few hydropower owners have gone into bankruptcy blaming the lack of subsidies.
These days, the opposition promises to make amends with the investors who were
cut out if they come to power, so the story is not finished yet.
To find the impact of the certificates for a single hydropower investor we can make
a simple calculation of the present value of an annuity for 15 years after taxes.
Here it is assumed that the revenue from elcertificates is 20 e/MWh, the profit
tax rate is 28% and the after tax required return is 5%. To make the calculation
independent of the size of the power plant, we calculate the present value on a per
unit of production basis by dividing the investment cost with the expected annual
production (e.g. e/MWh/y).
Revenue15t=0 =(1− τProfit)
X1
r
[
1− 1(1 + r)n
]
=(1− 0.28) 200.05
[
1− 11.0515
]
= 149.47
(2.1)
We find that the present value of the revenue from electricity certificates is ap-
proximately 150 e/MWh/y, which means that we can suffer an investment cost
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Table 2.1: Publicly available information regarding hydropower subsidies pub-
lished by the Norwegian government in the period 2002–2011
Year Information published by the government Introduction
year
2002 The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is positive to es-
tablishing an international certificate market and believe
Norway should participate in it (Ministry of Petroleum
and Energy, 2002).
-
2003 Parliament asks the Government to initiate a
Swedish/Norwegian certificate market.
-
The Petroleum and Energy Minister says power pro-
ducers who initiate building after 1st January 2004 will
have the opportunity to participate in the scheme, even
though a scheme will be established afterwards (Min-
istry of Petroleum and Energy, 2003).
2004
2004 A draft on the Elcertificate Act is sent to external hear-
ing. Start-up in 2006 is recommended by the Ministry
(Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2004).
2006
2005 A common market is delayed one year (Ministry of
Petroleum and Energy, 2005).
2007
2006 In the start of the year the negotiations break down.
Already established policy instruments is said to
be strengthened (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy,
2006a).
-
2007 A feed-in-premium will replace the certificate market.
Hydropower will receive 5e/MWh for production repre-
senting the first 3MW of the installed capacity (Ministry
of Petroleum and Energy, 2006b).
2008
2008 The feed-in-premium is put to hold and conversations
with the Swedish government is revitalized (Ministry of
Petroleum and Energy, 2007).
-
2009 The Swedish and the Norwegian government sign an
agreement on the basic principles for the common mar-
ket. Start-up is determined 2012 (Ministry of Petroleum
and Energy, 2009a).
2012
Transitional arrangements are decided to take place for
power plants built after 7th September 2009. For power
plants ≤ 1MW the previous date, 1st January 2004,
is still maintained. The years prior to 2012 will be
withdrawn from the 15 years of certificates (Ministry
of Petroleum and Energy, 2009b).
2010 The Swedish and Norwegian governments sign a proto-
col concluding the discussions on a system for renewable
energy certificates (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy,
2010).
2012
2011 A draft on the Elcertificate Act was approved by the
Council of State (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy,
2011).
2012
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150 e/MWh/y higher than what was feasible before the subsidy scheme. This
number coincides with figures released from Statkraft, one of Norway’s largest
hydropower producers. They indicate that they can increase their investment
cost by 100 e/MWh/y compared to previous break-even points when including a
subsidy price of 14 e/MWh for the future revenues, shown in Figure 2.1. For the
uppermost plant displayed in grey (25MW/100GWh), the old break-even point
A specified a maximum investment cost of 325 e/MWh/y given an expected
future electricity price of 50 e/MWh. The new break-even point when we include
subsidies B, lies at approximately 425 e/MWh/y. On the color scale on the x-axis
it is indicated that an investment cost below 500 e/MWh/y is acceptable. Prior
to the introduction of elcertificates, a project was said to be viable if the cost was
below 375 e/MWh/y.
Figure 2.1: Break-even lines (dotted) for two large hydropower projects
(Statkraft, 2012)
2.2 Price Determination
The economic principles behind the elcertificate market are similar to those for
the electricity market. The Nordic electricity markets were liberalized during the
1990’s and fully integrated from year 2000. Justification for liberalization was that
economic efficiency would ensure that the most cost efficient plants were operating
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and invested in. Prices are determined in a common market through supply and
demand, depending on a merit order curve. It should on average equal the long
run marginal cost (LRMC) of investing in a new power plant (Wangensteen, 2012).
A detailed description of consumer-based tradable green certificate systems can
be found in Schaeffer et al. (1999), Morthorst (2000), Amundsen and Mortensen
(2001), Jensen and Skytte (2002), Jensen and Skytte (2003) and Fristrup (2003).
Morthorst (2003) discuss the separate introduction of an international tradable
green certificate market into a liberalised power market. This is the way the market
is arranged today. The thought is that the investor receives a twofold revenue - one
part from sale of elcertificates and the other part from sale of electricity. Eligible
power producers receive certificates according to their amount of production (e.g.
MWh). Power distributors and some end users are mandatory buyers of certificates
for a proportion of what they deliver or uses. Thus, the system is self-contained and
requires no governmental support. Power distributors subsequently charge this on
top of the consumer’s energy bill. Consumers are on the other hand experiencing
lower power prices due to the increased supply of energy. Producers who were
already in the market before the scheme was implemented thereby experience
lower revenue due to lower prices and end up as the ones paying for the scheme.
In addition, some producers will find the price below their marginal production
cost and reduce their production.
The proportional amount the power distributors have to buy is variable each year
and given by the quota curve set by the Elcertificate Act §17, shown in Figure 2.2.
This curve could be subject to changes, as the government could revise the scheme
to make sure they reach the policy target. The quota is in fact the only possibility
the government has for control. However, to reduce uncertainty for investors it is
important that the changes are predictable, long-term and transparent.
The given quota makes sure that the average price in the market is determined
based on the LRMC, as with electricity. The twist is that the total revenue from
both electricity and elcertificates should equal the LRMC for investors. Market
mechanisms are designed so that the price of electricity plus elcertificates will
equal the LRMC needed to reach the target of 26.4 TWh in 2020. This long term
equilibrium can be viewed as an anchor we expect prices will converge towards
with time. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.2: Power distributors’ mandatory quota for elcertificates as a per-
centage of their distribution. Source: Elcertificate Act §17
Figure 2.3: The price of elcertificates is determined by LRMC subtracted the
electricity price (Morthorst, 2003)
Banking of elcertificates is allowed, enabling speculators to participate in the mar-
ket and trade it like any other commodity. This is expected to improve market
efficiency and reduce possibilities of arbitrage. Another feature of the principle
of banking is that it reduces the volatility in the market, pointed out by Amund-
sen et al. (2006). They also point out that as banking is allowed, the relevant
price should each year represent the LRMC of future production discounted by
a required rate. The required rate is investor dependent, as the certificates are
subject to wealth tax and should give a return equal to the investor’s alternative
cost of capital.
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Figure 2.4: The price of elcertificates is determined by supply and demand.
We can see that an excessive supply leads to lower prices. Source: Svensk
Kraftma¨kling (SKM)
Even though prices should equal the LRMC discounted by the required rate, it
could deviate in the short run. Morthorst (2003) state that ”a number of reasons
might exist that the expected equilibrium would not be fulfilled, among these
most importantly that the volume of generated electricity would differ from the
expected production.”. As both demand and supply of elcertificates are stochastic,
the short term equilibrium depends on how much electricity is being consumed
and produced. Supply and demand could also deviate due to changes in general
market conditions or risk preferences. Then, the price is determined based on the
short run marginal cost (SRMC) curve. When the expected amount of production
is not met or overrun, it leads to a deficit or surplus of certificates in some years.
When the surplus of certificates increases, the price generally falls as there is larger
supply than demand. The relationship between price and accumulated surplus in
Sweden is displayed in Figure 2.4.
This negative correlation (-0.65) between price and accumulated surplus is said to
ensure the policy target to be met. If the price of certificates is too low to give
incentive for new investment, the number of certificates supplied is unchanged
given an equal amount of production. Simultaneously demand for certificates
increases based on the quota curve, leading to a deficit of contracts and thereby
rising prices. When the prices have risen enough, new investment will regain
momentum.
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Once a year at 1st of March, Statnett (the Norwegian transmission system oper-
ator) will compute the required contract volume for the producers. It is the dis-
tributors and end users own responsibility to have bought their required amount
of certificates by the 1st of April. These contracts will then be taken out of the
buyer’s balance and nulled. If the buyer fails to meet his requirements, he will be
fined. Thus, the fine imposes a price ceiling in the market. Nevertheless, trad-
ing occurs daily and the liquidity for both spot and forward contracts is said to
be sufficient. Trades take place over the counter (OTC), often through a broker
or by bilateral agreements. Recently, NASDAQ OMX opened an exchange for
trading in future contracts as well. All trades are reported to national registers:
NECS in Norway and Cesar in Sweden. Figure 2.5 show the daily close spot
price quoted by the firm Svensk Kraftma¨kling (SKM). The contract volume from
a single power producer is often low and it is time consuming to monitor the mar-
ket. Consequently, non-professional producers often have a distribution agreement
with a more skilled agent. If the license holder of the small hydropower plant is
professional, they are more likely to trade themselves.
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Figure 2.5: Price of elcertificates from 05.2003–03.2013. Source: Svensk
Kraftma¨kling (SKM)
2.3 What Resources Are Developed Under the
Support Scheme?
By looking at the merit order of potential new production over the short term (10-
15 years), we can predict what energy sources are developed under the certificate
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Figure 2.6: Potential for hydropower in Norway (NVE, 2012)
scheme. It is expected that wind power will be developed in both countries. In
Norway more hydropower will be developed, while in Sweden bio power is expected
to cover a large share of new production (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2010).
Bio power here is mainly reconstructing fossil fuelled plants into combined heat
and power plants using wood as an energy source.
The potential for new renewable energy in both Norway and Sweden is vast. Still,
there are many aspects which constrain a rapid development, including high devel-
opment costs, exhausted transmission capacity and the time spent by regulators
processing licenses. Ministry of the Environment (2012) notes that ”How compre-
hensive the development of renewable energy becomes, depend on many factors,
including preservation of nature, technological progress, development costs and
future price- and market expectations by the participants.”.
Recent figures from Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE)
show the overall hydropower potential in Norway, displayed in Figure 2.6. We
here see that a large share of the undeveloped potential is protected and that the
largest proportion of new possible production will come through small hydropower
projects. A possibility study on future production in Norway performed by NVE
and Enova in 2008 estimated that it will be possible to increase the production of
renewable energy with approximately 30 TWh within 2020 (NVE, 2010b). The 30
TWh assume a split between hydropower and wind power of 13 TWh and 17 TWh
respectively. Production from bio in Norway was not considered as it predicted to
become a scarcity of this resource in future. This resource also receive less certifi-
cates per unit of production than hydro and wind, as it is not as environmentally
friendly due to an energy efficiency of approximately 40%. In Sweden, bio power
is already big and the third largest source of electricity behind hydropower and
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Table 2.2: Potential and LRMC for the most cost efficient renewable energy
sources in Norway (NO) and Sweden (SE) Sources: Statens energimyndighet
(2007), NVE (2010b), EIA (2013), ICE Endex Wood Pellets
Energy source LRMC [e/MWh] Potential, NO Potential, SE
Hydropower 32-48 13 TWh 0.5 TWh
Bio 54-64 - 3 TWh
Wind power onshore 59-89 17 TWh 10 TWh
nuclear power. The short term potential for new renewable energy consists of 3
TWh for bio and at least 10 TWh of new onshore wind power. Due to protection,
the hydropower potential in Sweden is only 0.5 TWh (Statens energimyndighet,
2007). Offshore wind power was considered too expensive in both Norway and
Sweden.
Hydropower is currently the most cost-efficient renewable energy source, with a
LRMC in the range 32-48 e/MWh (NVE, 2010b). The second most cost efficient
energy source is bio energy with a LRMC of 54-64 e/MWh (ICE Endex Wood
Pellets, EIA (2013)). The LRMC of wind is predicted to be in the range of 59-89
e/MWh (NVE, 2010b). A summary of the short-term production potential and
its LRMC is given in Table 2.2.
Based on the LRMC of the marginal production unit at 26.4 TWh, we can in-
fer what the elcertificate price should be to give incentive to a required number
of investors. By horizontally aggregating the potential production based on the
LRMC from Table 2.2 we find the merit order of production, illustrated in Figure
2.7. Here we have assumed that the cost curves are linear, in practice they depend
on the individual projects. At 26.4 TWh, it is calculated that wind power will
be the marginal investment unit for Norway and Sweden combined. At current
elcertificate price levels, only hydropower and bio power are economically viable.
The required certificate price by wind power investors can be calculated as the
difference between the LRMC and the electricity price. Looking at future and for-
ward contracts we can get a picture of the future electricity and elcertificate price.
We have chosen the 2016 contracts due to low liquidity further ahead. Setting
the LRMC of wind to 72 e/MWh, and knowing that the 2016 future contract for
electricity in May 2013 was traded at 34 e/MWh (ENOYR-16, NASDAQ OMX),
the certificate price needed to trigger investment is 38 e/MWh. In May 2013, the
forward for elcertificates with delivery in MAR-16 was traded at 23 e/MWh. We
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can therefore expect certificate prices to increase in future. However, the obser-
vation that future prices are far away from the target, indicates that investors do
not forecast an elcertificate price of 38 e/MWh.
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Figure 2.7: Merit order of potential production in Norway and Sweden [TWh]
(Ministry of Finance, 2008). We see that the target of 26.4 TWh of new renew-
able energy is achieved at ∼72 e/MWh.

Chapter 3
Modelling the Investment
Decision
To model the investment decision a real options model has been developed. In this
chapter, the characteristics of the investment decision will be explained in Section
3.1, to provide a better understanding of the modelling choices which follows
after in Section 3.2. The model will be illustrated and results from a parameter
sensitivity analysis will be discussed in Section 3.3 and 3.4.
3.1 Characteristics of the Investment Decision
Developing a hydropower plant is a tedious process. A new investor has to follow
many steps in a process which require a variety of skills. The first step is to de-
velop a fundamental plan. Where do I situate the power plant, what dimensions
are suitable, what are my costs and how much revenue can I expect? This forms
the basis for an application which is sent to the regulator NVE. NVE process the
application, making sure the power plant is according to the laws and preserve
the natural environment. If a licence is granted, the investor continues with more
detailed planning. In depth hydrology studies are evaluated and tenders are ad-
vertised, so that contractors can bid their price for doing the job. Also, the budget
is updated and evaluated once more. Finally, after several years, the investor can
make the final decision to invest.
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There are several factors leading to profitability uncertainty which are relevant
when making the investment decision. Interest rate risk, unforeseen building costs,
variable price of electricity and subsidies, variable price of electricity distribution
and illusive hydrology conditions. Nevertheless, many of these factors can be ac-
counted for without increasing the costs substantially. The most prominent factors
affecting profitability is the revenue from selling electricity and elcertificates. The
reason for this is straightforward when looking at the characteristics of the invest-
ment and the timing of the cash flows. Investing in a hydropower plant requires
a large up front expenditure to build the power plant, which later almost runs by
itself with low operation and maintenance costs. The revenue stream is therefore
approximately the selling price of electricity and elcertificates, and varies with pro-
duction over time. The up front investment cost is large, and consequently make
up a big consideration when making the investment decision. Though, it is easier
to estimate than the future electricity price. It is therefore chosen to model both
the electricity price and the price of elcertificates as uncertain and fluctuating over
time, while the investment cost is modelled as constant.
If the investor has some leeway in the timing of the investment, he could sometimes
gain additional value by waiting for more information. The investment decision
can then be regarded as a real option to invest which is possible to exercise at any
moment in time. In financial terms this characteristic pay-off structure is called
an American call option. The investor should in such a case only invest when the
alternative cost of terminating the option is accounted for.
Once the investor has obtained a license to build a hydropower plant, he has to
invest within 5 years. Otherwise he must send in an application for prolonging the
license for 5 new years. This is usually granted. Thereby we can assume that the
license lasts forever and the investors can choose to invest at their own convenience.
Thus, we assume the lifetime of the option to be perpetual. Sometimes financing
opportunities are only valid for a short period of time. In such a case, the investor
has to decide on a now or never basis. The value of the option to wait is zero when
the investment can only occur on a now or never basis. Thus, the investor could,
but only in this case, make a rational decision based on the basic Net Present
Value (NPV) rule.
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3.2 The Real Options Model
The real options model is a dynamic programming model inspired by Boomsma
and Linnerud (2013). It is chosen to follow the terminology in Dixit and Pindyck
(1994). Taxes are omitted for simplicity when first deriving the equations in
Section 3.2.1. Nevertheless, its impact is added in the following Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 Derivation of the Optimal Stopping Boundary
We want to define the optimal stopping boundary where the prices are sufficient
for the investor to make an investment decision. For comparability between power
plants, we evaluate the measures on a per unit of production basis (e.g. e/MWh).
To obtain the total amount of profit, revenue or costs, one can multiply the re-
spective amount with the expected annual production of the power plant, Q.
Both the price of electricity (Pt)t≥0 and subsidies through the price of elcertifi-
cates (St)t≥0 are taken as uncertain with respect to time t. They are modelled
stochastically as Geometric Brownian motions (GBM):
dPt = αPPtdt+ σPPtdzPt (3.1)
dSt = αSStdt+ σSStdzSt (3.2)
Here, the αP , αS, σP and σS are constants and represent the trend parameter,
also called the drift rate, and volatility for the price of electricity and elcertificates
respectively. The last term in both equations, dz, is a standard Brownian motion
(BM). The two BMs are correlated, denoted as E[dzPdzS] = ρP,S.
When we consider the company as a price taker, the expected present value of
the investment, V , is consequently a linear function of two variables following
GBM. Using continuous compounding, the function for V becomes (derivation in
Appendix A):
V (P, S) = rPP + rSS (3.3)
where
rP =
(
1− e−(r−αP )TP
r − αP
)
, rS =
(
e−(r−αS)TS1 − e−(r−αS)TS2
r − αS
)
(3.4)
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Here we have discounted the future cash flows with the required rate of return of
the project, r. As the subsidy is only granted for a given number of years, the
lifespan of the revenue stream for electricity TP and for the elcertificates TS2 is
different. We assume that revenue from sale of electricity is starting from time
period 0. We have accounted for a delayed start-up of revenue from electricity
certificates through TS1 . The main reason for the delay is the time taken by
politicians to introduce a subsidy scheme, further discussed in Section 4.2.
The net expected profit when you invest is found by the NPV rule: V (P, S)− I.
The investment cost per unit of production, I, consists of the initial sunk cost
taken on by building the plant I0 and the present value of maintenance costs, C:
I = I0 + C (3.5)
Here, it is assumed that it is never optimal to shut down the plant, which is true
for almost all hydropower plants, based on economic reasons. We can assume that
the maintenance cost per unit of production, ct, grows with the annual inflation
rate, i, set at a constant rate reflecting the inflation target. Thus, the present
value of the maintenance costs can be discounted to time 0:
C =
∫ TP
0
cte−rtdt =
∫ TP
0
c0e−(r−i)tdt = corC (3.6)
where
rC =
(
1− e−(r−i)TP
r − i
)
(3.7)
We deviate from the terminology in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) by including the
maintenance cost in I instead of V . Nevertheless, as the maintenance cost can be
discounted back to time 0, it does not affect the investment decision whether it is
included in V or I. For simplicity, it is therefore included in I, although it is not
a part of the initial sunk cost I0.
At each point in time, the investor could decide whether to invest or to keep the
option alive. To be able to decide the optimal timing of the investment, we need
to value the real option. It is optimal to exercise the investment option when its
value, F (V ), is equal to the NPV. If the value of the option surpasses the NPV,
it is optimal to postpone the investment and continue to hold the option. It is
therefore common to refer to the option value as the continuation value. The value
of the option is therefore the maximum of investing now, or the continuation value.
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This is represented by the Bellman equation:
F (P, S) = max
{
V (P, S)− I, 11 + rdtE [F (P + dP, S + dS)|P, S]
}
(3.8)
Because we have a perpetual option, we have time-homogeneity in the value pro-
cess. Therefore, we can omit the t-subscripts. On the left hand side of the Bellman
equation, we have the value of immediate exercising of the option. On the right, we
have the continuation value: the discounted expected value of all future optimal
decisions given the stochastic development. We can expand the expectation using
Itoˆ’s Lemma, as in Karatzas and Shreve (1991). After some algebra, we arrive at
a partial differential equation (PDE) which is valid for F(P,S) when continuation
is optimal (i.e. F (P, S) ≥ V (P, S)− I):
1
2
(
σ2PP
2∂
2F
∂P 2
+ σ2SS2
∂2F
∂S2
+ 2σPσSρP,SPS
∂2F
∂P∂S
)
+αPP
∂F
∂P
+αSS
∂F
∂S
− rF = 0
(3.9)
This equation is a second order homogeneous PDE. A first order homogeneous
PDE for a two-factor problem has a known solution1, shown in McDonald and
Siegel (1986) and used in a similar problem in Gravdehaug and Remmen (2011).
We can assume a generic solution similar to this, which is often called the Bellman
solution as it is a solution to the Bellman equation:
F (P, S) = AP βPSβS (3.10)
To check whether this is a possible solution, we insert it into the PDE in equation
(3.9), rearrange and obtain the fundamental quadratic equation Q(βP , βS) = 0:
Q (βP , βS) =
1
2
(
σ2PβP (βP − 1) + σ2SβS(βS − 1) + 2σPσSρP,SβPβS
)
+ αPβP + αSβS − r = 0
(3.11)
This is the equation of an ellipse present in all four quadrants of the plane. When
βP = 0 or βS = 0, we have the standard quadratic function in option valuation
with a positive and a negative root comprehensively explained in Dixit and Pindyck
(1994). The β’s can not be negative as it will create an invalid option value if any
the prices fall to zero. We therefore restrict the attention to those solutions that
1One can let F (P, S) = Pυ(p), p = PS for some function υ(·) and reduce the two-factor
problem to a one-factor problem.
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we find in the first quadrant:
βP , βS ≥ 0 (3.12)
The optimal stopping boundary is a solution plane consisting of a set of optimal
values for S∗ and P ∗. Boomsma and Linnerud (2013) explain that ”the prices at
which it is optimal to invest, i.e. the investment triggers, define a one-dimensional
subset of P × S space”.
The project value when it is optimal to invest, is denoted F (P ∗, S∗) and varies
along the boundary. It is also independent of time, as the PDE in Equation (3.9)
is time-homogeneous. The optimal decision rule is consequently that we invest the
first time P and S reaches the boundary P ∗ and S∗ simultaneously.
To solve for the elements in F (P, S) we need the corresponding boundary condi-
tions. We have the value matching condition and the smooth pasting conditions
defined at optimal investment point. Additionally, we should make sure that the
value falls to zero when prices are zero. This is in fact already handled because
if either P or S go to zero, the properties of the GBM ensure that value F will
remain at 0 in future (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
F (V (0, 0)) =0 (3.13a)
A(P ∗)βP (S∗)βS = rPP ∗ + rSS∗ − I (3.13b)
AβP (P ∗)βP−1(S∗)βS = rP (3.13c)
AβS(P ∗)βP (S∗)βS−1 = rS (3.13d)
By manipulation of the boundary conditions b)-d) shown in Appendix A we get
an expression for the triggers:
P ∗ = βP
βP + βS − 1
I
rP
, S∗ = βS
βP + βS − 1
I
rS
(3.14)
Intuitively, the triggers increase with the investment cost and decrease with the
discount rate. At this point, we have 5 unknowns (A,P ∗, S∗, βP , βS), but only
four equations, (3.11) and (3.13 b)-d)). The solution thereby has one degree of
freedom. Hence, in contrast to the standard real options problem, the value of the
investment cannot be determined before prices actually reach the trigger. To find
the required subsidy level for investment to be optimal, we choose to specify the
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electricity price. For a given price Pt = P , we introduce a new variable:
η(P ) = I − rPP
rPP
(3.15)
From inserting this in the left side of Equation (3.14) we find that
βS = βPη(P ) + 1 (3.16)
The β’s depend on each other, making the triggers dependent on each other. Using
the expression for βS, the optimal time to invest is the first time St ≥ S∗(P ), where
S∗(P ) = βPη(P ) + 1
βP (η(P ) + 1)
I
rS
, Q(βP , βPη(P ) + 1) = 0, βP , βPη(P ) + 1 ≥ 0 (3.17)
The expressions for η(P ), I and rS can all be evaluated when we have chosen
P. When we insert Equation (3.16) in the quadratic Equation (3.11) we arrive at
(derivation in Appendix A):
βP,1,2 =
−b±√b2 − 4ac
2a (3.18)
where
a = 12
(
σ2P + σ2Sη2(P )
)
+ σPσSρP,Sη(P ) (3.19a)
b = 12
(
−σ2P + σ2Sη(P )
)
+ σPσSρP,S + αP + αSη(P ) (3.19b)
c = αS − r (3.19c)
conditional on
βP , βS ≥ 0 ⇔ βP , βPη(P ) + 1 ≥ 0 (3.20)
As we can not prove homogeneity of degree one, the sum of the β’s must also be
higher than one.2
βP + βS > 1 (3.21)
We can find an expression for A by manipulation of the boundary conditions:
A = rβPP r
(1−βP )
S β
−βP
P β
(βP−1)
S S
∗(1−βP−βS) (3.22)
2Recall that when βP = 0, it is well known from the standard real options problem that the
positive root of the quadratic equation satisfies βS > 1, and vice versa when βS = 0 then βP > 1.
Hence, the ellipse defined by Q(βP , βS) = 0 must always be above the line βP + βS = 1 in the
first quadrant of the plane.
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Substituting this in Equation (3.10) we have the final expression for the project
value at the optimal stopping boundary.
F (P ∗, S∗) = rβPP r
(1−βP )
S β
−βP
P β
(βP−1)
S S
∗(1−βP )P ∗
βP (3.23)
As mentioned before, due to the nature of the problem, we can not calculate
the value of the option outside of this boundary. One can only evaluate the
expected option value before reaching the triggers. Interested readers are referred
to Gahungu and Smeers (2009) who estimates the expected option value using
Monte Carlo simulation.
Inserting the triggers in the value matching boundary condition (3.13)b) we find
an interesting notion:
F (P ∗, S∗) = rPP ∗ + rSS∗ − I =
(
βP + βS
βP + βS − 1
)
I − I (3.24)
Because βP + βS > 1 when investment is optimal, the value of the option requires
that the present value of income is greater than the costs. As usual in real op-
tions problems, uncertainty and irreversibility drive a wedge between compounded
revenues and investment cost.
3.2.2 Including Taxes
Taxes are time varying, depending on revenue, depreciation and variable costs
each year, such as maintenance costs and interest costs. Hydropower plants are
subject to several taxes, all explained in Appendix B. A summary is given in Table
3.1.
In our model, the taxes come into play in V (P, S) as they depend on the variables P
and S. Additionally, we have to change the required rate to an after-tax required
rate. If we subtract the full expression for the taxes in Equation (B.2) from
Equation (3.3), the present value of revenue adjusted for taxes equals:
V (P, S) = (1− (τProfit + τEconomic Rent|R>L)) (rPP + rSS)−X (3.25)
where τProfit is the profit tax rate and τEconomic Rent|R>L is the economic rent tax
rate paid by plants with a size R above the limit L. If we set
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Table 3.1: Summary of relevant taxes for small hydropower plants and his-
torical rates in the period 2001–2012
Tax Description Historical
Rates
Profit Tax Profit tax is calculated as the earnings before
taxes (EBT) multiplied by a rate τProfit.
τProfit = 28%
Property
Tax
Municipalities have the opportunity to claim
property tax. The rate τProperty is multiplied
by the market value of the power plant.
τProperty = 0.7%
Economic
Rent
Economic rent is a tax to collect super prof-
its and only applicable for hydropower plants
with power rating R above a threshold L. The
rate τEconomic Rent|R>L is multiplied with the
revenue, subtracted maintenance cost, amorti-
zation and depreciation, property tax and free
income. Free income is calculated as the aver-
age book value multiplied by a norm rate rNorm
set by the government.
2001–2007:
27%, 2008–2012:
30%, 2001–2003:
L = 1.5MVA,
2004–2012:
L = 5.5MVA
Natural
Resource
Tax
Natural resource tax is coordinated with the
profit tax, such that an investor will never pay
more than τProfit altogether. It is therefore
omitted in the calculations. Similar to the eco-
nomic rent, it is only applicable for hydropower
plants with a rating R above a given threshold
L.
1.625 e/MWh,
2001–2003:
L = 1.5MVA,
2004–2012:
L = 5.5MVA
B = (1− (τProfit + τEconomic Rent|R>L)) we get:
V (P, S) = B (rPP + rSS)−X (3.26)
The expression X is independent of the production and thereby constant for each
power plant. It includes maintenance cost, amortization and depreciation, prop-
erty tax, interest costs and free income based on the norm rate. We collect it in
one term:
X = (τProfit + τEconomic Rent|R>L) (−c0rC − 2.5%I0rR)
+ (1− τEconomic Rent|R>L)τPropertyUpper Limit rR
+ τProfit
− rDebt75%I0
(
rR − 5%
r
(
rR − TP e−rTP
))
+ τEconomic Rent|R>L
− rNormI0
(
rR − 2.5%
r
(
rR − TP e−rTP
))
(3.27)
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where
rR =
(
1− e−rTP
r
)
(3.28)
We see that if both tax rates τProfit and τEconomic Rent|R>L are set to 0, B equals
1. Then, the only adjustment we are left with is the property tax τProperty in X.
If this rate is also set to zero, τProperty=0, we arrive at the initial definition of the
present value.
The new definition of the present value leads to changes in the boundary condi-
tions. By following the steps in the previous derivation (specifying the electricity
price and finding an efficient substitution by creating a new variable η) we find
the new triggers. The new η(P )τ adjusted for taxes is defined as:
η(P )τ =
(X + I)−BrPP
BrPP
(3.29)
Then we can use the same substitution as previously for βSτ as the values for P ∗τ
and S∗τ are:
βS,τ = βP,τη(P )τ + 1 (3.30)
P ∗τ =
βP,τ
βP,τ + βS,τ − 1
X + I
BrP
, S∗τ =
βS,τ
βP,τ + βS,τ − 1
X + I
BrS
(3.31)
As the expression for βS,τ stays unchanged (except for a change of notation from
η(P ) to η(P )τ ), the solution to the fundamental quadratic βP,τ stays unchanged.
The expressions for the investment triggers adjusted for taxes P ∗τ , S∗τ is different
compared to the investment triggers without taxes, previously shown in Equation
(3.14). Thus, the investment triggers are dependent on the tax regime. We know
that B ≤ 1, but the size of X could be either positive or negative. It is negative for
our example power plant used in a sensitivity analysis in Section 3.4. The observed
result when performing the sensitivity analysis is that the investment triggers have
increased. Simultaneously, the project value at the trigger has changed. As we
are indifferent to holding the option or investing, we can study the project value
using the NPV approach or by calculating the option value. At the trigger, the
NPV equals:
F (P ∗τ , S∗τ ) =B(rPP ∗τ + rSS∗τ )− (X + I)
=
(
βP,τ + βS,τ
βP,τ + βS,τ − 1
)
(X + I)− (X + I)
(3.32)
The overall impact of taxes on the project value at the trigger is ambiguous when
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Table 3.2: Chosen parameters for a hypothetical power plant
Notation Parameter Value
I0 Investment cost 350 e/MWh
c0 Start value annual maintenance cost 9 e/MWh
αP Electricity price drift rate 2.5 %
αS Subsidy drift rate 2.5 %
σP Electricity price volatility 15 %
σS Subsidy price volatility 15 %
ρP,S Correlation -0.5
r Required return 5 %
TP Lifespan of power plant 40
TS2 Lifespan of subsidies 15
TS1 Revenue lag of subsidies 1
looking at the NPV compared to Equation (3.24). B decreases the value of
F (P ∗τ , S∗τ ), while the new triggers and X increase the value. We therefore use
the other approach and study the option value at the trigger. The expression for
Aτ and F (P ∗τ , S∗τ ) including taxes are both multiplied by B:
Aτ = Br
βP,τ
P r
(1−βP,τ )
S β
−βP,τ
P,τ β
(βP,τ−1)
S,τ S
∗(1−βP,τ−βS,τ )
τ (3.33)
F (P ∗τ , S∗τ ) = Br
βP,τ
P r
(1−βP,τ )
S β
−βP,τ
P,τ β
(βP,τ−1)
S,τ S
∗(1−βP,τ )
τ P
∗βP,τ
τ (3.34)
Multiplying by B reduces the option value. Opposite, the trigger price S∗τ has
increased and increases the option value. The overall effect is therefore still am-
biguous. To find the impact of the taxes, we must evaluate the expressions using
a case study. A sensitivity analysis is therefore performed in Section 3.4.
3.3 Illustration of the Real Options Model
To get an impression of the behaviour of the real option model we use a case
study for illustration. We here evaluate the exercise boundary and project value
excluding taxes. The chosen parameters belong to a fictitious power plant and are
displayed in Table 3.2. The investment cost represents the average power plant
in our data set. The parameters are used when calculating the optimal stopping
boundary for an electricity price ranging from 0 e/MWh to 50 e/MWh. For each
electricity price, we find the minimum required subsidy level S∗ for investment
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Figure 3.1: The optimal stopping boundary for an example power plant
to be optimal. The boundary is displayed in Figure 3.1 and we see that it is
non-linear with respect to P and S.
The boundary divides the graph into two regions: the continuation region and the
investment region. As long as the combination of a given electricity price and a
given subsidy price is below this boundary, you should wait with the investment
and continue to hold the option. Opposite, when the pair of electricity price and
subsidy price is situated above the boundary, it is optimal to invest immediately.
At the boundary, you are indifferent, as the option value is equivalent to the NPV.
From Figure 3.1 we can infer that subsidies are required even when the electricity
price is 50 e/MWh. Given the average price in May 2013 for the electricity future
with maturity in 2016 (∼34 e/MWh, NASDAQ OMX) and elcertificate forward
with maturity March-2016 (∼23 e/MWh, SKM), we would find ourselves situated
just above the exercise boundary for this example power plant. Nevertheless, bear
in mind that this is before we include taxes in the calculations.
We can evaluate the project value at the boundary. The result is displayed in
Figure 3.2 and 3.3, using a range from 0 to 50 e/MWh for the electricity price
and the corresponding optimal subsidy price from Figure 3.1. The project value
is almost equal for the pairs [P=5,S=105] and [P=50,S=9]. From this we can
infer that a high electricity price alone leads to a larger project value than a high
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Figure 3.2: Project value at year 0 for an example power plant given a set of
optimal electricity prices [0.05-50 e/MWh] and corresponding subsidy prices at
the exercise boundary
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Figure 3.3: Project value at year 0 for an example power plant given a set of
optimal electricity prices [0.05-50 e/MWh] and corresponding subsidy prices at
the exercise boundary. The set of optimal prices lead to a varying project value
at optimal investment point. When both prices are at a comfortable distance
from 0, we are willing to invest with a lower present value of future pay-offs,
due to an insurance-effect created by a negative correlation between the prices.
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subsidy price alone, if the prices were equal. This is due to the bounded lifetime of
the subsidy. For electricity certificates the lifespan is 15 years. Comparatively, the
power plant has a revenue stream from sale of electricity over 40 years. We can
also see that the project value is consistently greater than zero, a characteristic
implied by the option from Equation (3.24). Because you have the opportunity
to defer exercising, in some cases you do not invest even though you have positive
NPV, because the value of the option is higher than the NPV.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Knowing how the parameter values affect the optimal stopping boundary is useful
when interpreting the results. We therefore analyse the effect of varying one
of the parameters from Table 3.2 at a time while keeping the others constant.
Additionally, we investigate how the model responds when adding taxes.
3.4.1 Parameter Sensitivity
The results from the sensitivity analysis with respect to parameter values are
displayed in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5. By looking at the illustrations, we first
notice that none of the parameters have a linear relationship with respect to the
electricity price. We second notice that the parameters with the largest impact
on the exercise boundary is the investment cost, I0, the drift rates, αP and αS,
as well as the correlation ρP,S. We will now discuss the impact of the parameters,
one by one, following the sequence of the illustrations.
From Figure 3.4(a) and Figure 3.4(b) we see that a higher drift rate leads to a
higher trigger value. The reason for this is that a high drift rate implies that the
prices will increase in the long run, making waiting more valuable. When looking
at Figure 3.4(c) and Figure 3.4(d) we see that the choice of volatility has little
impact compared to other variables. A possible explanation of this could be that
the timespan of the revenue-stream is long. Even though the volatility does not
seem to have much impact, it is mainly because of the chosen range of the y-axis. If
we would have restricted the graph to a more realistic range of subsidy prices, the
volatility would have shown more impact. We thereby support the usage of a two
factor model instead of a one-factor model. Furthermore, a change in volatility has
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(a) Electricity price drift rate, αP
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(b) Subsidy drift rate, αS
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(c) Electricity price volatility, σP
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(d) Subsidy volatility, σS
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivity analysis by varying one parameter at the time
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Figure 3.5: Sensitivity analysis by varying one parameter at the time
an ambiguous impact depending on the electricity price. For a given electricity
price there seems to be a threshold where the impact of a marginal change in
volatility changes direction. Actual electricity prices were mostly to the right of
this threshold of approximately ∼20 e/MWh for the period 2001–2012. We can
see that increasing electricity price volatility leads to a higher trigger value, while
an increased subsidy volatility leads to a lower trigger. This has implications for
the interpretation of the two-factor model. Compared to a one-factor model with a
deterministic subsidy price (σS = 0), the two factor model predict a lower exercise
boundary for the uncertain subsidy than the deterministic subsidy. Surprisingly,
a two-factor model thereby gives a lower trigger than a one-factor model would
have predicted.
From Figure 3.4(e) we see that the required rate r has a negative effect on the
investment boundary when increasing the rate from 7.5% to 10%. When the inter-
est rate increases, the future cash flows are discounted at a higher rate. Thus, the
present value of revenue decreases and a higher trigger is required. However, if we
reduce the interest rate from 7.5% to 5% the trigger also increase. This is due to
the lease rate, δ. The lease rate is defined as the difference between the required
rate and the drift rate, δ = r − α, and could be viewed as dividends foregone
by not investing. A low lease rate makes it more optimal to wait, and increases
the boundary. Consequently, the behaviour of the interest rate depends on how
close the required rate is to the drift rate. The value of the correlation affects
the curvature of the boundary, shown in Figure 3.4(f). If the prices are negatively
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correlated, the trigger is lower and the slope is curved. By being negatively corre-
lated, we have an implicit insurance policy. If one of the prices decrease, in most
cases, the other price will increase. Thereby we can take the risk of investing at a
lower boundary.
In Figure 3.5(b) we see that the investment cost paid the first year has signifi-
cant impact when determining the exercise boundary. When the investment cost
increases, the exercise boundary is pushed outwards. It is natural that the in-
vestor requires a higher revenue when the cost increase. This logic applies to the
maintenance cost in Figure 3.5(a) as well.
3.4.2 Tax Sensitivity
In Section 3.2.2 we derived the real options model including taxes. By looking at
the equations, the impact on the triggers and project value was ambiguous. We
therefore evaluate the trigger and the project value for the example power plant
with and without including taxes. As most small hydropower plants do not pay
economic rent, we have omitted this tax here, setting τEconomicRent to zero. We use
a before-tax required rate for the trigger and project value when we omit taxes,
while we use the after-tax interest rate otherwise.
From Figure 3.6 we see that incorporating taxes causes a similar effect as increased
maintenance cost, or increased investment cost as in Figure 3.5. It has a nega-
tive impact on the required prices, raising the triggers. For example, our example
power plant would not be built given the average future electricity price in May
2013(∼34 e/MWh, NASDAQ OMX), unless we received a subsidy of 33 EU-
R/MWh. Given that the average price for the March-2016 elcertificate forward
was just 23 e/MWh, we would not invest if we were faced with the decision today.
From Figure 3.7 we see that the required project value triggering investment is
equal for the scenario including taxes up to a certain level of electricity price
(P= 18 e/MWh). Above this price level, the required project value triggering
investing is higher for the scenario without tax. The reason why the project value
without tax increase more than the project value with tax in the latter case, is
that the costs withdrawn are constants through X and I. The revenue is the
variable entity. In the present value equation including taxes (3.32), the revenue
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Figure 3.6: The optimal stopping boundary is increasing when we incorporate
taxes
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Figure 3.7: The project value at the optimal stopping boundary with and
without taxes
is multiplied by B. Consequently, the project value grows at a slower pace with
the parameter B as a buffer, when the subsidy price has marginal contributions.
Chapter 4
Data
We have updated and extended an existing dataset initially gathered by Heggedal
et al. (2013). It consists of 214 licences to build small hydropower plants granted by
NVE in the period 2001–2008. In this chapter’s first Section 4.1, we will describe
the collection process and the content of the dataset. It is worth noticing that
the data has been collected in two stages, first from the regulatory database and
thereafter through interviews with the license holders. The response rate from
the interviews was 99%. Secondly, we will present the choice of parameters and
assumptions plus its reasoning in Section 4.2. Lastly, we will present descriptive
findings from the data in Section 4.3.
4.1 Gathering the Dataset
The dataset was gathered with the intention of replicating the investor’s decision
problem: Do I invest now or do I wait and see? This would be compared with the
actual decision made. Necessary information comprised cost data, production size,
important dates and the license holder’s current status amongst others. Hence,
the dataset should contain both quantitative and qualitative information, defined
as a mixed approach. For description of features and advantages of using a mixed
approach we refer to Creswell (2009).
The foundation of the dataset is data from the regulatory database kindly provided
by NVE. They store detailed information concerning applications and licenses
such as application date, license date, rated power, expected annual production,
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investment cost, filed complaints, ownership and in some cases cause of delays
when the power plant for example face problems accessing the transmission grid.
Nevertheless, what the investor proposes in his application is only a draft. After
a license is granted the investor have some leeway in the scope of the project. For
example, an investor can increase or decrease the size of the turbine within ±10%
without informing the regulator. Additionally, more detailed planning is performed
after the license is granted. The common experience is that the actual investment
cost increase compared to the initial application, due to a more profound planning
and changed market conditions. The processing time for an application at the
regulator could be several years due to a boom in interested investors and cost
inflation in the industry has been high during the latest decade.
To minimize the impact of these uncertainties and improve the quality of the
data it was chosen to interview the license holders. By supplementing the dataset
with interviews we were able to obtain information about investors’ expectations
regarding subsidies and profitability, possible delays and whether the costs and size
of the plant deviate from the original application. Additionally, we could learn the
current status of the project, as well as discuss assumptions and parameters they
have used in their own calculations. The interviews were mainly conducted by
telephone and in some cases by e-mail when more convenient.
The dataset in Heggedal et al. (2013) had a respond rate of 85% (179 of 214) and
were collected during 2011. The respond rate is now increased to 99% (211 of
214), after new attempts to contact the investors who did not respond previously.
Additionally, we have contacted investors reporting they had not yet decided to
invest when the original dataset was gathered in 2011. In total, 53 power plants
have been updated in this round, making the total data set valid for the period
2001–2012. The survey we applied when updating and extending the dataset is
attached in Appendix C.
We believe the quality of the data is high. A feature of the interview is that
the interviewer can state his purpose and clarify any misunderstandings. We also
believe that the data is neither understated nor overstated, as the investor have
no gain from manipulating the results. The only way to get the desired qualitative
information about expectations is through interviews.
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In the three cases where we did not get a response we follow the approach in
Heggedal et al. (2013), who relied on data from the regulatory database and infor-
mation found on the internet. Such information could be local newspaper articles
or tenders written by the license holder.
4.2 Assumptions and Parameters
To be able to calculate the value of the power plant we made assumptions where
numbers are incomplete. Many of the decisions and calculations were made a
decade ago. When speaking to the investors, some of them did not remember the
exact numbers and made a guess. Others did not remember what was included
in their numbers. To maintain consistency, we therefore made a few generalizing
assumptions. We have also assigned values to parameters taken as input to the
real options model.
We used a common rate for maintenance cost per unit of production for all the
power plants in the data set. Maintenance cost for a hydropower plant usually
consists of payments related to machine service, wages, insurance, transmission
costs and rental payments for the right to use the river. As small hydropower
plants are mainly run-of-river, they do not need production planning and constant
surveillance. The maintenance cost is therefore low compared to the initial invest-
ment cost and is roughly calculated as 1% of the investment cost annually (NVE,
2011). Our belief is that the 1% does not cover insurance and transmission cost.
We consequently chose to set the annual rate a bit higher than 1%, at 9 e/MWh
in 2012, in line with Heggedal et al. (2013). In the years prior to 2012 we have
deflated this measure so the annual maintenance cost follows the expected annual
inflation rate of 2.5%. In cases where the license owner is also the land owner,
the rental payments for the right to use the river should still be included as an
alternative cost. He or she still has the opportunity to rent the rights to the river
to others.
Hydropower owners are characterised by being either local land owners or larger
companies owning several licenses. We choose to separate them in two groups:
professional investors and non-professional investors. We define a professional
investor as one that owns more than one license in our dataset.
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When conducting the survey we strived to obtain the expected investment cost at
the time the decision to invest was made. If a decision was not yet made, we tried
to obtain the most current cost estimate. In the cases where the investor did not
remember exactly the relevant cost, either the cost from the license application, or
the actual incurred investment outlay is used. To get the relevant cost in each year
in the investor possessed a license, the number we got from the investor is inflated
or deflated according to the NVE Hydropower Index shown in Figure 4.1. Due to
lack of data we have assumed that the growth rate in 2011 and 2012 is equal to the
growth rate in 2010. The index is representative for a high pressure facility, with
large tunnel costs and a usage time of 4 000 hours/year. It is calculated based on
the average Norwegian hydropower plant, not just small hydropower plants. Still,
we find it a good proxy and the best available for our purpose.
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Figure 4.1: NVE’s Hydropower Index (NVE, 2011)
NVE claim that it was a weak market in 2000–2005, resulting in a limited increase
in prices in this period. However, the market experienced great activity domesti-
cally and internationally in 2006–2010 which led to a substantial price increase in
some areas or industries (NVE, 2010a).
Revenue from operating a hydropower plant depends on the annual production.
Future production depends on precipitation, but it is almost impossible to fore-
cast hydrology years ahead. As a proxy for production we have used the expected
annual production. The amount of production each year is thereby modelled as
constant, while in reality it is an uncertain variable. Nevertheless, this assump-
tion does not have a large impact on the results, as the average production will
Chapter 4. Data 41
Table 4.1: Expected year of introduction of subsidies and its corresponding
lag in revenue TS1
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Intro. 2004 2004 2004 2006 2007 2008 2008 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012
TS,1 3 2 1 2 2 2 1 4 3 2 1 0
converge to the expected average production as the years of production increase.
Additionally, as the pants are run-of-river they are often subject to a minimum
required flow of water due to both biological and aesthetic reasons. This means
that they cannot produce all the water that comes running in the river, but has
to leave some of it outside of the pipes. When precipitation is high, power prices
are generally low. As small hydropower plants usually operate without storage in
dams, the average selling price for small hydropower plants could be lower than
the average power price. When speaking to investors, they did not seem to expe-
rience a much lower average price. We have therefore not accounted for this in the
model, but recognise that the power prices could be an upward bias.
Sødal (2006) study the effect of a construction lags on an uncertain, irreversible
investment and find that the conventional effect on price uncertainty is weakened
when there are lags. He believes the contrasting result arises due to the lag in rev-
enue, and that the opportunity cost of waiting does not depend on the price during
the delay, but the price in the future. This make the firm hurry in order to avoid
learning of high prices while it is still out of the market. For small hydropower
plants it is common that the building period stretches over 1.5 years. Revenues are
thereby delayed, but for simplicity we assume that revenues from sale of electricity
are continuous from the day the investment decision is made. Delay in revenue
from elcertificates has been accounted for, as the delay is variable in the period
between 2001–2012 and thereby have a bigger impact on the results. The delay is
affected by both the time consumed by building the plant, and subsequently the
time taken to process the application for the certificates, as you can only apply
for certificates after the plant is in operation. Nevertheless, it is mainly the time
needed for political decision making causing delay in revenues. Based on political
statements in Table 2.1, the expected year and corresponding lag for introduction
of subsidies is set in Table 4.1. It leads to a loss in revenue if you invest before
the scheme is implemented. Electricity certificates are granted for a period of 15
years from the first day of production. Thereby, if you built your plant in 2010,
you would only receive certificates for the period 2012–2025.
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of the spot price and the 3-year future contract for
electricity. Source: Nord Pool Spot, NASDAQ OMX
Electricity is continuously traded both on spot and future markets and the price
is variable, displayed in Figure 4.2. Liquidity in the future market stretches out
only 3 years ahead. Thereby, over the lifespan of the power plant the electricity
price is uncertain. The volatility of the daily return on a 3-year forward contract
in the period 2001–2012 is calculated to be 15.5% annually. For spot it is much
higher, due to price spikes. For comparison, the volatility of the daily return for
elcertificates on SKM Spot was 15.3% annually from 2003–2012. Some investors
mentioned that they experienced a lower average price because of the geographical
location of the power plant. The Nord Pool Spot operates with a system price, but
will also quote area prices to deal with congestion management. In Norway, there
are currently 5 price areas, NO1–NO5, but this has been subject to changes in
the past as it depends on where the transmission capacity is exhausted. In Figure
4.3, the yearly average system spot price along with the quoted price for the areas
is illustrated. Here we see that it is only the most current years when prices are
diverging from the system price (2008,2010). This is caused by cold winters and
all time high demands. Nevertheless, as the dispersion in the average prices is
relatively small and not persistent with time, we have chosen to not account for
this in the model.
In the real options model we have assumed that both electricity and electricity
certificates follow GBM. This is to obtain a simple solution available to our prob-
lem. Electricity markets are characterised by high volatility and price spikes as
well as seasonal patterns, shown in Figure 4.2. It has unique features compared to
other energy commodities due to its non-storability further discussed in Eydeland
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Figure 4.3: The average area prices in Norway each year compared to the
system price. Source: Nord Pool Spot
and Geman (1999) and Lucia and Schwartz (2002). Based on these properties,
many articles and books propose other processes than the GBM for modelling
electricity prices. Both Weron et al. (2004) and Benth et al. (2008) recommend a
mean reverting model with jumps for modelling electricity prices in the Nord Pool
market. An empirical analysis by Koekebakker and Ollmar (2005) show less corre-
lation between short-term prices and long-term prices in electricity markets than
in other commodities markets. This support the two-factor model of commodity
prices by Schwartz and Smith (2000) that allows mean reversion in short-term
prices and uncertainty in the equilibrium level to which prices revert. Lucia and
Schwartz (2002) have studied the Nordic electricity market using both a one-factor
and a two-factor model and found that the two factor model have a better fit to the
data. However, Schwartz and Smith (2000) argue that when considering long-term
investments, the long-term factor is the decisive one. Similarly, Pindyck (2000)
claims that when considering long-term commodity related investments, a GBM
description of the price will not lead to large errors. Thereby, we find it reasonable
to make the assumption that the electricity price follows GBM. As elcertificates
are dependent on the electricity through the quota, we find it appropriate to use
this model for elcertificates as well. The calculated starting prices each year for the
electricity is displayed in Table 4.2 along with the drift rates for both electricity
and the subsidy.
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper empirically testing the behaviour
of electricity when including elcertificates is Heggedal et al. (2013). They find
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Table 4.2: Starting values of the electricity price and drift rates
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
P0
a 16.7 19.6 21.3 24.9 28.3 37.4 44.3 51.8 46.9 41.1 42.9 40.4
αP
b 5% 4% 4% 2% 1% 0% -1% 0% 0% 1% 2% 2%
αS
c 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 4% 0%d 2% 0% 1% 4% 4%e
a [e/MWh] The starting price of electricity is calculated using the discounted three-
year future contract averaging prices over the first half of the present year and the
last half of the previous year.
b The drift rate for the electricity price is calculated as the yearly average drift rate
between two and three year future contracts.
c The electricity certificate drift rate is calculated as the annual required rate ensuring
that the electricity certificates invoke wind power investment within 2020. The calcu-
lations are based on a LRMC of wind at 75 e/MWh, future price of electricity at 35
e/MWh, giving a required subsidy level of 40 e/MWh.
d The drift rate is set to 0% as a fixed feed-in-premium was promised in 2007 for the
first 3MW in each power plant.
e The drift rate was calculated at 7%, but is set to 4% which is below the required rate
of return, to ensure a positive lease rate and convergence to a solution.
that a deterministic process and a mean reverting process perform significantly
better than regressions based on the stochastic GBM price process. This should
be acknowledged when interpreting the results.
Simple linear correlation is likely to be an insufficient descriptor of the relation-
ship between P and S. Bye (2003) perform simulations based on introduction
of subsidies through certificates in the Norwegian power market. He finds that
the behaviour of the sum of electricity price and the subsidy price is ambigu-
ous, depending on the elasticities and the required amount of green energy, the
quota. When new production is introduced to the market, the production volume
increases causing a rightward shift in the supply curve. The demand function
remains constant, thereby electricity price falls. Simultaneously, the elcertificate
price increases as the higher production volume induces a high demand for cer-
tificates as the quota is production dependent. As long as the quota continue to
increase with time, which it does in our case, new production will be added and
this negative relationship will continue. Therefore, we would expect the relation-
ship to be negative and we can make an assumption that the relationship is not
far from linear without too much error.
The linear correlation between the prices was found to be close to zero, indicating
no relationship at all. Nevertheless, investors might have had the expectation that
the prices were in fact negatively correlated. We have therefore chosen to use
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Table 4.3: Required rate of return and the norm rate for each year
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
r 8% 8% 7% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 6% 6% 5% 5%
rNorm
a 10% 10% 10% 10% 9% 7% 7% 5% 5% 2% 2% 2%
a The norm rate is each year set by the government. It was from 2001–2007 set as
the three-year average of interest rates on government bonds plus a risk adjustment
of 4%. From 2008–2012, the 12 months Treasury bills without risk adjustment were
used. The norm rate is set in arrears. We therefore included a 1 year lag, as this was
the available information to the investor.
a correlation of -0.5 when finding our results. Lemming (2003) finds that in his
framework, certificate prices and fluctuations in production from wind turbines will
be negatively correlated and, as a result, certificate price fluctuations can actually
help decrease the total financial risk. When there is low wind production, this
production must be replaced by other renewable energy which is more costly and
certificate prices increase. Thereby, revenue will be more stable for wind turbines.
The same argument can be used with hydropower even though it constitutes a large
share of the power production in Norway because the market is interconnected with
Sweden, which has a larger share of non-renewable power like nuclear.
The cash flows in the model are taken as after-tax cash flows to total capital. The
required return was calculated using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) on
an after-tax basis. As a proxy for the risk free rate we used the interest rate on
5-year government bonds from Norges Bank. The market premium was set to 5%.
Using a beta of 0.7 recommended by Gjølberg and Johnsen (2009), we got the
results displayed in Table 4.3. In the table we also include the norm rate, rNorm,
used to calculate free income relevant for the economic rent tax. In addition, we
assume that the debt interest rate, rDebt, is 4.5%.
The size of the power plant is an important feature when evaluating taxes. Cur-
rently, hydropower plant owners are subject to economic rent and natural resource
tax when exceeding a labelled power of 5.5MVA, duly explained in Appendix B.
Under normal operating conditions, most generators produce real power [MW]
and reactive power [MVAr]. Easily explained, the reactive power is produced to
compensate for losses in the lines during transmission. With a power factor1 of
0.9 a production of 5.5MVA corresponds to an active effect of 4.95MW. But, as
power factors are dependent on the operating state in the electricity grid, which
1The power factor is defined as the real power delivered to the load divided by the apparent
or total power in the circuit (Saadat, 2011)
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is variable, it can also be up to 1. Thereby, we can draw an equality between the
labelled power and the real power as an assumption.
In the first round of interviews it was not asked whether the investors paid prop-
erty tax. A feature of the property tax is that it is voluntarily claimed by the
municipalities. In 2011, 73% of all municipalities in Norway claimed property tax
(Advokatfimaet Lund & Co DA, 2012). Because of the opportunity of high rev-
enues, municipalities containing hydropower plants usually claim this tax, as they
are often located in rural areas without many other sources of tax revenues. We
therefore assume that all hydropower plants pay property tax unless otherwise is
clarified.
4.3 Descriptive Data
We here summarise the basic features of the collected data. Aggregated, the
licenses comprise 672.9MW of generation capacity, 2.43TWh of expected annual
production and an investment expenditure of e1,023 million (cost basis 2012). Put
in perspective, this equals almost 2% of the annual power production in Norway
(NVE, 2012).
Heggedal et al. (2013) found a distinction in the investment behaviour among
professional and non-professional investors. The illustrations are therefore split
into these categories where possible. In the data set there are 101 professional
investors, and 113 non-professionals. 4 of the biggest companies with main focus on
building small hydropower plants have created the Small Hydropower Alliance G4.
The related companies are Sma˚kraft, Norsk Grønnkraft, Fjellkraft and Elvekraft.
Of the 101 professional licenses, they own 40. Non-professional investors could have
less access to funding, be less diversified, have fewer available projects, be more
risk averse and have less knowledge or information about regulatory processes. As
noted by Bulan et al. (2009), most neoclassical models (such as CAPM) would
predict that greater uncertainty caused by not diversifying leads to an increase in
the non-professional investor’s required rate of return.
In our data set, 201 power plants report a power rating ≤ 5.5MW, and 13 above.
Of the latter, two of them are a sum of two power stations in the same river, and
thereby each rating is actually below 5.5MVA per plant. Thus, they are free from
natural resource tax obligations. Many of the licenses were initially given to plants
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with a larger size, but due to the natural resource tax, investors have scaled down
their projects. 11 of the 13 plants above ≤ 5.5MW are owned by professional
investors. Regarding the hydropower plants ≤ 1MW, 27 out of 30 are owned by
non-professionals. The average size of the professional’s power plants is 3.85MW.
The average size of the non-professional projects is 2.51MW. There seem to be no
particular pattern regarding the average size of investment each year, except for
a high peak in 2004 when the average size of investment was 4.32MW. This exact
year, the government eased the lower boundary for economic rent and natural
resource tax from 1.5MVA to 5.5MVA.
The yearly distribution of the licenses and the decisions are illustrated in Figure
4.4. It is worth noting that the yearly number of granted licenses has increased
drastically. The number of years from the license was granted to the actual invest-
ment decision was made, is displayed in Figure 4.5. Bear in mind that this is not
adjusted for external delays such as filed complaints and transmission problems.
The fact that almost half of the investors decide to invest in the same year they
received the license show that many investors have already decided when enter-
ing the application. This was also an observation during the interviews. Some
of them, when they were asked about the timing of their decision, stated that
they decided when working on the application. It could be that they do not view
the license as an option to invest. Disregarding the holdouts, the average time
to decide was 1.5 years for professional investors, while only 0.92 years for non-
professionals. Additionally, if we adjust for external events causing delay in the
decision making process, the average time to decide was lowered to 0.94 years for
professional investors and 0.53 years for non-professionals.
There are many explanations to why there are still 23 power plants who have not
invested. We believe the main reasons are low profitability and grid-regulations.
Some of the investors experience that they are not able or allowed to connect to
the transmission grid. Others have lost interest in the project and do not have it
as a priority at the moment. 10 of the 23 power plants who have not yet decided
are ≤ 1MW. Moreover, they represent only 14% of the licences. Opposite, in the
group of hydropower plants ≥ 5.5MVA only 1 of the 13 plants have not made an
investment decision yet.
We find that the average investment cost per unit of production is higher on
average for smaller plants, at 401 e/MWh/y. Compared to the total average
of 347 e/MWh/y, it could be evidence for economy of scale. A scatter plot of
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Figure 4.4: Number of licenses granted and number of investments each year
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Figure 4.5: Number of years from a license was granted to a decision was
made
investment cost per unit of production versus production size display a spurious
relationship with a linear R2 = 0.008.
An illustration of the average investment cost in each respective year, if investment
was decided, is displayed in Figure 4.6. We here see that the average cost of the
plants that is not yet invested in, is highest. It is also interesting that investments
seem to follow a pattern of merit order, the more profitable plants are invested
in first. This pattern is still present if we adjust for inflation. We acknowledge
that there could be an upward bias in the average investment cost in the later
years compared to the whole market, as we only investigate licenses granted to
and including 2008. As the most profitable projects are invested in first, the plants
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Figure 4.6: Average investment cost each year
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of investment cost
with high investment cost are postponed and thereby cause a biased sample in the
later years.
In 2011, a time when the elcertificate scheme was determined, the upper limit for
development costs was said to be 580 e/MWh/y (NVE, 2011). The distribution
of the power plants’ investment cost is displayed in Figure 4.7. We here use the
investment cost from the year the decision was made, or if not yet decided, the in-
flated number corresponding to 2012. The qualitative result does not change much
if we adjust all numbers to the same cost basis. Most of the power plants are dis-
tributed below the upper limit of 580 e/MWh/y. Non-professionals have a much
lower average cost, at 294 e/MWh/y. Professionals average on 405 e/MWh/y.
An explanation for this could be that the professional investors have more finan-
cial muscle and dare initiate more expensive projects. Additionally, projects where
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non-professionals face financing constraints, are often sold to professionals after
the license is given.
Chapter 5
Results
In this chapter we first present the results from the real options model. Then, we
compare this to results from the simpler NPV model. We will also discuss whether
the models display rational investment behaviour. Subsequently, we perform a
probit panel data regression to test whether the real options model is a good
description of the investment behaviour.
5.1 Main Results
We have evaluated the real options model for each power plant in the years it pos-
sessed an active license to invest. The parameters are updated for each year, rep-
resenting the available information presumably known by the investor, explained
in Chapter 4. In the year the investor chose to invest (i.e. exercised the option),
we calculate the implied subsidy level, S∗, required for investment to be optimal
given the current electricity price.
We can only calculate the option value at the exercise boundary. Thus, we can
not use our results directly in the years when the investor did not decide to invest.
Nevertheless, we know that the investor would require a similar or higher subsidy
level than that predicted at optimal investment point. We will therefore also try
to infer something from the results in the years the investor did not invest and
continued to hold the option. Here, we have excluded observations where the
investor was held back by external reasons.
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For comparison, we perform an analysis of the NPV without subsidies in the years
the investor possessed an active licence. We also calculate the required subsidy
level for the NPV to equal zero. A zero NPV is the optimal investment point
following the NPV rule.
5.1.1 Results From the Real Options Model
The average implied subsidy price each year, in cases where the investor decided
to invest, is displayed in Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1. It is compared to the average
Swedish elcertificate price over the same period and the results from the real
options model when the investor did not invest.
The required subsidy level when the investor did invest coincides very much with
the elcertificate price in the years 2003–2010, while the required subsidy level is
much higher in the years 2011 and 2012. As the market for elcertificates opened in
2003, there are no comparisons in 2001 and 2002, but relative to the years after,
the required subsidy level is high. Both the magnitude of the subsidy and the
evolution of the magnitude, apart from a slight hike in 2005, are similar to the
price of elcertificates. This could indicate that investors had a long eye towards
Swedish elcertificate prices when they invested. The predicted required subsidy
level for the investors that did not choose to invest is generally higher than both the
required subsidy rate for the investors that did invest and the elcertificate price.
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Figure 5.1: The average required subsidy level for investment compared to
the elcertificate price. Source: Svensk Kraftma¨kling (SKM)
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This show rational investment behaviour in the sense that investors who deferred
investing require higher subsidies than investors who did invest. Additionally, as
the required subsidy level for the waiting investors is generally higher than the
elcertificate price, it would not be optimal to invest if expectations were in line
with the elcertificate price. The investor would consequently wait as predicted by
real options theory.
From quotes gathered during the interviewing process, it is clear that investors
had different expectations towards subsidies and that they varied with time. A
full list of quotes is found in Appendix D. Based on the quotes and the political
statements displayed in Table 2.1 we would expect the amount of implied subsidy
to be higher in the years where political discussions were aspiring (2004–2005,
2009–2010) and lower in the years it was entrenched (2006–2008). Especially in
2007, when a much lower feed-in-premium of 5 e/MWh was to replace the idea
of elcertificates, we would expect a lower level of implied subsidies. Although
the general level of expectations towards subsides are lower in the years 2006,
2007 and 2008, it is about three times the level of the feed-in-premium. We
therefore fail to see a corresponding magnitude in the responsiveness in the results.
Nevertheless, talk about the feed-in-premium only lasted for approximately a year
and we acknowledge that it could be difficult for investors to turn on the heel on a
short notice. Through the incorporated lag in revenues from subsidies in Table 4.1,
we also account for some of the political delay and thereby reduce the magnitude
of the responsiveness. Furthermore, the promise of a transitional agreement from
The Petroleum and Energy Minister in 2004 saying that all who invested would
be included in the scheme in arrears, also oppose the effect. Consequently, as the
results show a drop of almost 10 e/MWh in implied subsidies from 2005 to 2006,
we believe that the political discussion had a negative and delaying effect on the
investors, strengthening the real options assumption.
Explanation for the higher average level in the years 2001–2002 and 2011–2012 can
be found by looking at the distribution of the required subsidy levels for those who
chose to invest. In Figure 5.2 a scatter plot of all the observations is displayed,
together with histograms. From this, we can see that the number of observations
in the beginning and the most current years are much lower than the rest. The
averages are therefore more sensitive to outliers. Furthermore, we only include
licenses granted in the period 2001–2008 in our dataset. Our sample is therefore
subject to a selection bias, as numerous licences were granted and exercised in the
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period 2009–2012 which is not part of our dataset. We believe the bias lead to
a non-realistic high required subsidy rate in the later years, because the sample
only consisted of the most unattractive and expensive projects, or else they would
have been invested in previously.
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Figure 5.2: Scatter plot of the required subsidy level in the year the investor
chose to invest, along with histograms
Looking at the sensitivity analysis in Section 3.4 and the state variables in Chapter
4 we can explain it further. In 2001–2002, the required return was at its highest, at
8%. Simultaneously, the power price was at its lowest at 16.7 e/MWh in 2001 and
19.6 e/MWh in 2002 and the electricity drift rates were at 4% and 5% respectively.
Moreover, the investment cost per unit of production was at all-time high in 2011–
2012 and the subsidy drift rates were at 4%, close to the required rate at 5%, giving
a low lease rate. All of these aspects lead to an increased trigger according to the
model, as discussed in the sensitivity analysis, with the investment cost and the
electricity price as the largest determinants. The observation that investors did
invest even though profitability was lower in 2001-2002 could be explained by
noting that the spot price was much higher than the future prices used in the
Chapter 5. Results 55
model. It could be that investors had good hopes for the far future and believed
more in the level of the spot price than the future price.
5.1.2 Results From an NPV Approach
Results from the real options model indicate that investors on average expected a
subsidy equal to the Swedish elcertificate price when they invested. However, one
should be careful when interpreting the results as we assume that the investors are
following the decision rule of real options. Both Gravdehaug and Remmen (2011)
and Heggedal et al. (2013) find that for most Norwegian hydropower plants, the
real options approach does not seem to better explain the investment behaviour
than the NPV rule. Additionally, the short time spent by investors to make an
investment decision could also contradict a real options approach. As explained
in Section 4.3, they spend on average less than a year to decide after they receive
a licence, after correcting for external delays. It could be that they do not regard
the licence as an option to invest, but a now-or-never opportunity.
If a now-or-never approach is applied, the correct decision rule is the NPV rule. If
we look at the NPV at the time of investment without including subsidies, we can
study the investor expectations assuming that they follow the NPV rule. We find
that 122 plants invested with positive NPV, 68 with negative, giving a total number
of 190 investing. Separating the professional and non-professional investors we find
that non-professionals invest at a higher average NPV than professional investors,
indicating a higher required return predicted by Bulan et al. (2009). 45 professional
investors invested with positive NPV and 44 with negative. 77 non-professionals
invested with positive NPV and 24 with negative.
If we find the NPV per investment cost we get a proxy for the return on investment
(ROI). ROI is defined as earnings, subtracted initial investment cost, divided by
the initial investment cost. To account for the time value of money we replace
the numerator, i.e. earnings subtracted initial investment cost, with the NPV.
Thus, the ROI is already discounted using the required rate of return, which can
be viewed as an alternative cost of capital. The resulting return of interest gives
information about the profitability after the required return has been given to the
investor.
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Figure 5.3: The distribution of ROI for power plants disregarding subsidies
The distribution of ROI for all the power plants that chose to invest is illustrated
in Figure 5.3. The distribution exemplifies a smooth curve with only a few extreme
points. This could evidence that the variation between plants are due to additional
reasons we have not been able to model. One should therefore be careful and not
draw too many conclusions from the plants with negative ROI, as there could be
individual differences we have not been able to account for. For example, we have
chosen to assume a common rate for maintenance cost and included property tax
where otherwise was not clarified. In reality, it is therefore possible that they
invested with positive NPV. Nevertheless, assuming that the additional reasons
are evenly distributed across all plants we can use the NPV to find the implied
subsidies.
The investor is indifferent to investing if the expected payoff is zero. Setting the
NPV including subsidies to zero, we can find the minimum subsidy level required
for investment:
S|NPV=0 = X + I
rSB
− rPP
rS
(5.1)
The results from this approach is displayed in Figure 5.4 and Table 5.1 together
with the Swedish elcertificate price. We see that the minimum required subsidy
level on average for those who invested is negative in most years, in 8 of 12. This
is expected as the average ROI is positive looking at Figure 5.3. As the certificate
price cannot be negative, we interpret the negative numbers such that the investor
would be willing to invest even without subsidies. It is therefore a possibility that
the investors did not expect subsidies at all when they invested. Reasons for this
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could be that the investors did not rely on the government’s promises and only
invested if they had positive NPV, even without subsidies. For example, some
investors claimed ”We did not dare to believe in revenue from elcertificates.” and
”We started production without even considering revenue from elcertificates. We
have economy to manage without.”. This show that investors could be risk averse
(Pratt, 1964) and relying on subsidies before a scheme is implemented imposes
a risk. Also, investors might not get the necessary financial support to make an
investment decision with negative NPV, as banks do not grant loans based on
uncertain expectations.
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
40
Year
S
u
b
si
d
y
P
ri
ce
,
S
[E
U
R
/
M
W
h
]
Required subsidy, S, NPV=0
Not invested, S, NPV = 0
Elcertificate price
Figure 5.4: The average required subsidy level for investment to be opti-
mal using the NPV rule, compared to the elcertificate price. Source: Svensk
Kraftma¨kling (SKM)
In 2001–2002, 2005 and 2007 the required subsidy level is positive, which imply
that someone invested with negative NPV. This can be explained by three possi-
bilities. The first, and the most likely according to us, is that the investors did
actually expect subsidies. The second possibility is that the negative NPV could
be caused by additional effects not captured by the model, while the third is that
the investor did not expect subsidies and behaved irrationally.
We believe, based on the results and the quotes in Appendix D, that the investors
who did invest actually expect subsidies, but did not incorporate them in full
magnitude as they were risk averse. An investor who decided to invest in 2007 said
for example: ”We expected to receive elcertificates given promises that everyone
who invested after 2004 would receive support, but we did not take it into account
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Table 5.1: Expected subsidies implied by the real options model and the NPV
calculations, along with the results when the investor deferred investment
Year Elcert
price
S∗ Not Invest
S∗
S|NPV=0 Not Invest
S|NPV=0
2001 - 46.7 37.2 6.2 -1.7
2002 - 46.0 42.8 12.8 9.7
2003 24.3 22.2 34.9 -12.0 -1.0
2004 26.0 21.1 26.3 -5.7 -1.2
2005 21.2 24.7 32.9 1.8 7.6
2006 18.4 14.4 26.2 -4.9 3.1
2007 22.0 19.4 27.7 4.0 12.8
2008 29.8 21.5 30.0 -10.6 -2.7
2009 30.6 23.6 29.2 -6.5 -1.4
2010 28.3 28.1 49.4 -3.0 17.4
2011 20.9 40.3 69.0 -15.0 -4.7
2012 19.4 60.3 78.8 -3.1 0.9
in expected revenues. Do never trust political promises.”. Another who invested
in 2009, just a few months before the new transitional agreement was set said ”It
was a big disappointment. We were sure we would receive elcertificates.”.
The trend in the required subsidy follows the pattern we would expect according
to the political statements in Table 2.1. We see that the investors are requiring
a lower profitability in 2004 and 2005 compared to 2003, and the same goes for
2009 and 2010 compared to 2008. In 2006, when negotiations broke down, the
profitability increased compared to 2005. The level of the required subsidy in
2007 also coincides with the outspoken level of the feed-in-premium of 5 e/MWh.
On the contrary, the implied subsidy in 2001, 2002 and 2011 do not fit in this
story. As mentioned, it could be that the hike in 2001–2002 was due to investors
expecting an electricity price in line with the spot price, and not the future price,
and the trough in 2011 we contribute to a selection bias. The interpretation
that investors were investing with a positive NPV, but also followed the pattern
of expected subsidies, points towards a behaviour according to the real options
decision making rule.
In the cases where the license holder did not choose to invest, the required subsidy
is positive on average. Thus, we have negative NPV on average and according
to the NPV rule you should not invest if you have negative NPV. Thereby, the
results display rational investment behaviour given that the investor did not rely
on subsidies. Nevertheless, we can not rule out the plausible explanation that
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the investors were waiting for more information or better market conditions, in
accordance with real options theory. The average required subsidy for the investors
that did not invest is in fact negative in 6 out of 12 years, meaning that the NPV
was positive half of the time. Thus, according to the NPV rule they should have
invested. This speaks against the validity of the NPV in our case, and we therefore
do not regard it as the best descriptor of the investment behaviour in our case.
5.1.3 Comparing the Results From the Two Approaches
The results show that the investor’s expectation to subsidies is dependent on the
applied model and its definition of the optimal decision rule. The real options
model predicts that investors expected subsidies in line with the Swedish elcertifi-
cate price. If we follow the NPV decision rule, investors did on average not rely on
subsidies. However, results from the investors that did not invest point towards
that the NPV decision rule might not be a correct descriptor of the investment
behaviour, as the NPV was positive in 6 out of 12 years. Results from the NPV
calculations where the investor chose to invest could also support a real options
decision rule, as the evolution in implied subsidies follow the predicted trend based
on publicly available statements published by the government.
Based on the quotes in Appendix D we further strengthen our belief that the
real options decision rule is a good descriptor of the investment behaviour, even
though there were individual differences across investors. A scenario described in
Heggedal et al. (2013) is that professional investors are behaving according the
real options theory, while non-professionals according to NPV. We also find this
pattern to some extent in our conversations with the investors.
We have analysed the implied subsidies while separating the results according
to professionalism, both in the cases where the investor chose to invest, or not.
The results are displayed in Figure 5.5 and 5.6 using the real options model and
NPV calculations. Our first observation is that in all cases, irrespective of model
choice or decision, the implied subsidies for the non-professionals are lower. This
coincides with the observation that the average cost for non-professionals is lower
than for professionals, thus, this was expected. Results from the real options model
show marginal differences depending on professionalism. Our previous conclusions
are therefore unchanged if we assume a real options behaviour. Results from the
NPV calculations however, lead to new insights. Here, the professionals require
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subsidies in 6 of 12 years when they invested. Thus, we have further support for
saying that investors required subsidies when investing. Non-professionals that
did invest have a positive NPV in 9 of 12 years and we therefore cannot rule out
the possibility that they invested depending on NPV. Non-professionals that did
not invest have a positive NPV in 8 of 12 years, contradicting the hypothesis in
Heggedal et al. (2013). Thus, our results infer that the non-professional investors
that deferred investment behaved according to real options theory.
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Figure 5.5: The average required subsidy level for investment to be optimal
calculated using the real options model, split depending on professionalism
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Figure 5.6: The average required subsidy level for investment to be optimal
calculated using the NPV rule, split depending on professionalism
In summary, we believe that the results favour an investment behaviour predicted
by real options theory over the NPV rule. This implies that the average investor
was expecting subsidies when he or she invested. The magnitude of the subsidy
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however is debatable. The real options model predicted subsidies in line with the
Swedish elcertificates, but few investors interviewed in this round proclaimed that
they incorporated revenues from subsidies of that size. Our real options model
may have overestimated the required subsidy as we assume a perpetual option. In
reality, investors must start the development within year 2020 to receive subsidies.
This year is consequently experienced as the final end of the license. Future
work should therefore be done on incorporating a finite lifespan of the option. In
addition, future work could incorporate a structural estimation model which will
most likely give a more accurate description of this magnitude. Also, future work
could be done on investigating our goal function. If our goal function is flat, the
range of almost optimal implied subsidies can be wide, without leading to a large
impact on the specified goal.
Recent numbers published by NVE show that there are currently 30 small hy-
dropower projects under construction, while 307 projects with an active license
are sitting on the fence (Europower, 2013). This further strengthen our belief that
investors are behaving according to real options theory.
5.2 Model fit
To investigate the applicability of the real options model further, we perform
a probit panel data regression with the investment decision as the dependent
variable. As we can not decide the value of the option outside of the exercise
boundary we can not test the real options model against the NPV. Instead, we
follow the approach in Moel and Tufano (2002) where we find the impact the
explanatory variables have on the investment decision. Then, we can compare this
impact to what is predicted by the real options model in the sensitivity analysis
in Section 3.4. If investors act in accordance with the real options model, then
the decision to invest will be related to the market conditions according to the
predictions.
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5.2.1 The Probit Panel Data Regression
The probit analysis of the likelihood of an investment decision is computed using
the probit model
Pr(y = 1) = Φ(β0 + β′x) (5.2)
where y is a dummy variable that equals one if the investment decision is made in
a given year, and zero otherwise. Φ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution, β0 is
the intercept, β′ are the coefficients and x are the regressors.
The chosen independent variables were the ones predicted to have impact on the
investment decision. In addition, we have chosen to control for other effects, such
as the size of the power plant, whether the power plant is subject to economic rent
tax, whether the investment decision was delayed by external factors and a linear
trend.
The sensitivity analysis in Section 3.4 leads to the following predictions for the
sign of the regression coefficients:
1. The expected investment behaviour with respect to the electricity price and
the elcertificate price is that a higher price would increase revenues, and
thereby the probability of investment (+).
2. We have also included the product of the electricity and the elcertificate price,
to account for the parabolic shape of the optimal stopping boundary, dis-
played in Figure 3.1. The parabolic shape is caused by the predicted negative
correlation between the variables. This parameter will only have an impact
if investors behave according the real options model, as the NPV do not
account for correlation. The expected impact would be that by including
this variable, we would transfer the positive effect from the individual prices
(+) over to their product and lose significance in those coefficients.
3. The investment cost has a negative impact on the investment decision: a
higher cost will make it less desirable to invest (-).
4. From Figure 3.4(c) and 3.4(d) we see that increased volatility transfer into a
two-fold response in the triggers, if we assume we are above some threshold
for the electricity prices (approximately 20 e/MWh). As the electricity
prices have been higher than this threshold in most of the years investigated,
we expect the behaviour predicted by the sensitivity analysis to the right of
this threshold. It is consequently expected an opposite investment behaviour
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with respect to the volatilities. The trigger is expected to increase with
increased electricity price volatility making it less probable to invest (-),
while the trigger decreases with increased subsidy volatility making it more
probable to invest (+). This difference is particular for this two-factor model.
In a single-factor model, increased volatility always increases the value of the
option and decreases the probability of investment.
5. The rate of return, r, has a dual behaviour depending on the size of the drift
rate α. If the required rate increases, the future cash flows will be discounted
harder. The present value of revenues then decrease, making it less likely to
invest (-). However, if the drift rate and required rate are close, the lease
rate is low. A low lease rate makes it more optimal to wait, and increases
the boundary. Thereby, if you have a required rate which is close to the drift
rate, increasing the required rate will increase the likelihood of investment
(+). This is what causes the dual behaviour, making it hard to predict the
expected sign of this parameter (+/-).
6. The same reasoning behind the threshold can be applied to the drift rates,
the α’s. Both drift rates increase the trigger to the right of the threshold
making it less desirable to invest (-), but based on Figures 3.4(a) and 3.4(b)
we expect a larger coefficient for the electricity price drift rate, αP .
In addition, we have included some of the variables multiplied by a binary dummy
for whether the investor is professional or not. We have done this for the electricity
price, the elcertificate price, the product of the two prices, the investment cost
and the volatilities. We expect these parameters to be significant if the investors
behave differently depending on professionalism. It is important to note that for
the non-professional investors, it is the original coefficient that is indicative. For
professional investors, it is the sum of the original coefficients and the coefficient
for the variable multiplied with the dummy. The latter coefficient represents the
difference in behaviour of the non-professional and the professional investors.
The control variables are not used to infer the applicability of the real options
model, but included to control for unobserved heterogeneity among power plants.
Based on the findings in the descriptive data in Section 4.3, we expect that the
economic rent tax and external delay should decrease the probability of investment
(-). The size of the power plant has no particular expectation. The linear trend
is included to account for a possible selection bias in 2009–2012. We assign the
variables the numbers 1–4, depending on the year 2009–2012, and 0 otherwise.
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In the regression, all data are taken as specified in Chapter 4 except for the volatil-
ities. The volatilities in the real options model were set constant. In this analysis
we have chosen to use the yearly average of the two-year rolling volatility for elec-
tricity and elcertificate price. In 2001 and 2002 we have used the elcertificate price
and elcertificate volatility from 2003, to avoid losing observations in these years.
5.2.2 Results From the Probit Regression
The results are displayed in Table 5.2. The mean value of the observed indepen-
dent variables in the regression is displayed in the second column. The average
investment cost and size is here different compared to what was calculated from
the original data set in Section 4.3. The reason for this is that we get additional
observations when investors deferred investment, as we include all observations in
each year the investor possessed an active license in the regression. Because the
most expensive power plants are never subject to investment and the option is
kept alive, we have more observations with high investment costs. The average
investment cost is therefore higher. In the regression we have a total number of
565 observations, 190 observed investing and 375 observations where there was no
investment decision. Of these, 140 observations experience delay due to external
reasons and are prevented from making an investment decision.
The results in parenthesis are the p-values for the significance of the coefficient. If it
is below 0.05 we know with statistically significance that the coefficient is different
from 0 at a 95% confidence level. At a first glance it is easy to see that very few
of the coefficients are significant. Lack of significance imply that the results are
not robust, which could lead to a change in the sign of the coefficients depending
on the specification of the regression. Inconsistency in the sign of the coefficient is
for example observed for the variables for electricity price and elcertificate price.
Finding that the regression is not robust could indicate that the regression lack
a sufficient number of observations. Our data set could be too small to get any
significant results. However, it could also imply that the regression is a poor fit
and that the chosen independent variables are of low importance to the dependent
variable.
We will further investigate the most important findings, but as they are not sig-
nificant, we will be careful in drawing conclusions. To begin with, we can not
say that the individual prices consistently show the effect predicted by the real
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Table 5.2: Probit analysis of the likelihood of an investment decision, condi-
tional on market conditions and investor characteristics. Number of observa-
tions: 565
Variable Mean
value
Exp.
sign
A B C D E
Intercept 0.41 0.42 3.12 -2.42 -2.92
(0.59) (0.59) (0.46) (0.42) (0.71)
El. price [e/MWh] 40.8 + -0.02 0.04* -0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.20) (0.02) (0.90) (0.96) (0.93)
El. price×Prof. 21.8 + -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05
(0.18) (0.19) (0.52) (0.28)
Elcert. price [e/MWh] 24.8 + 0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.11 0.15
(0.16) (0.29) (0.68) (0.11) (0.67)
Elcert. price×Prof. 12.8 + 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.06
(0.71) (0.94) (0.58) (0.33)
El.×Elcert.’ 1029.1 + 0.21 -0.11
(0.59) (0.89)
El.×Elcert.×Prof.’ 555.8 + 0.08 0.13
(0.56) (0.38)
Invest.cost’ [e/MWh] 534.8 - -0.48* -0.57* -0.62* -0.48* -0.53*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Invest.cost×Prof.’ 302.8 - -0.03 0.17 0.25 -0.11 -0.04
(0.64) (0.29) (0.22) (0.66) (0.88)
El. volatility, σP 16% - 1.65 0.81
(0.76) (0.90)
El. volatility×Prof. 8% - 0.21 1.36
(0.97) (0.80)
Elcert. volatility, σS 13% + -6.87 -7.80
(0.75) (0.79)
Elcert. volatility×Prof. 7% + 13.67 15.03
(0.08) (0.07)
Required return, r 6% +/- 40.12 39.44
(0.24) (0.27)
El. drift, αP 1% - -33.72 -35.10
(0.61) (0.66)
Elcert. drift, αS 2% - 24.38 24.85
(0.40) (0.43)
Size (MW) 3.0 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.11
(0.15) (0.09) (0.08) (0.19) (0.20)
Economic rent tax (1/0) - 0.02 -0.30 -0.35 0.00 0.03
(0.96) (0.55) (0.50) (1.00) (0.97)
External delay (1/0) - -9.63 -10.18 -10.30 -10.53 -10.66
(0.97) (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) (0.98)
Linear trend (0,1-4) 0.32* 0.45* 0.48* 0.77 0.80
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.12)
Pseudo R2 0.289 0.291 0.292 0.300 0.301
* Significance at a p-level below 0.05, ’ Coefficient scaled by dividing observations by 100
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options model. The coefficient for the electricity price and the elcertificate price
are similar in magnitude, but the signs are alternating depending on the speci-
fication of the regression. However, we are getting a significant electricity price
when including the electricity price multiplied by the dummy for professionalism
in specification B. The sign of the coefficient is also positive, which is what we pre-
dicted. If we combine the coefficient for the Electricity price with the coefficient
for the Electricity Price×Professional, we see that the sum is 0. This indicates
that the professional investors invested independently of the electricity price, while
non-professionals on the other hand paid attention to this variable.
Specifications C and E add the product of Electricity price×Elcertificate price. It
has the predicted effect as it reduces the significance of the individual prices, but
the sign is alternating. The investment cost has both the predicted sign and signif-
icance, while the investment cost multiplied with the dummy for professionalism
neither have the predicted sign nor significance.
Adding further variables in specifications D and E have little effect on the pseudo
R2, which indicate that the variables are not improving the regression noteworthy.
None of the variables for volatility, required rate or drift rate have significant re-
sults, and only the variables Elcertificate volatility×Professional, Electricity drift
rate and Required return have a coefficient consistently coinciding with the predic-
tion. The required return shows a behaviour which is predicted when the starting
point of the drift rate is close to the required rate. The Elcertificate drift rate
is consistently opposite to the prediction, which indicates that a higher drift rate
leads to a higher probability of investing.
The p-value for the variable Elcertificate volatility×Professional is low and sig-
nificant at a 90% confidence level. This indicates that the professional investors
responded more to the evolution of the Swedish elcertficate prices than the non-
professionals, predicted by Heggedal et al. (2013). It also implies that they were
expecting subsidies as they responded to the Swedish elcertificate development.
The external delay variable act according to the predictions, but not the economic
rent tax variable. The other control variables indicate that investors are more
likely to invest as the years go by caused by the possible bias, and prefer larger
power plants. The linear trend is significant in specifications A, B and C at a 95%
significance level, and in D at a 90% significance level.
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5.2.3 Comments to the Probit Regression Results
In summary, we have some support for saying that the investors act in accordance
with the real options model and that investors behaved differently depending on
professionalism. Simultaneously, as there is little significance we do not have
enough support for concluding that this is the case. But whether this is because
the investors do not follow the real options decision rule or due to an insufficient
number of observations in the regression, we do not know. In the analysis made by
Moel and Tufano (2002) there are 2056 observations from 285 gold mines, whereas
we have 565 observations from 214 power plants.
The results from the regression indicate that the investment cost is the only im-
portant variable to the investors when they decide. This is debatable, and was not
the impression we got when talking to the investors during the interviews. The
data sample seems to be too small, as investors following the NPV rule also pay
attention to the electricity price. We should therefore have expected a positive and
significant coefficient for all specifications under this decision rule as well. Thus,
one should not rule out the possibility that investors did follow the real options
rule because we do not have strong evidence that the investors followed the NPV
rule either. Nevertheless, we should not overlook the observation that the elec-
tricity price is significant in one of the specifications, where we separate out the
effect of professional investors. It is clearly a difference in behaviour between the
professional investors and the non-professionals. However, we find it difficult to
believe that professional investors did not pay attention to the future electricity
price. To test for this, we included the spot price as a variable in the regression,
but it did not lead to significant results.
To improve the results from the regression, future work should focus on gathering
more data from licences granted after 2008 and perform a more detailed analysis
with respect to subgroups amongst investors. Additionally, it would be interesting
to interview the investors about what proxies they use for the future electricity
price.
The lack of significance in our results also has impact for the interpretation of
the results in Heggedal et al. (2013). While we use the explanatory variables as
the regressors, Heggedal et al. (2013) test their real options model using a logistic
regression incorporating the real options value and the NPV value amongst others.
We find our approach more transparent, as we are not bundling the impact of the
Chapter 5. Results 68
variables into one unit. Our regression is thereby valid for both models, as they
have similar input variables. Heggedal et al. (2013) found significant results for the
hypothesis that non-professional investors behaved according to the NPV rule and
that professional investors behaved according to the real options theory. In the
light of our results, we should be somewhat sceptical to their significance levels,
but we still believe their conclusion is valid for the investors that did choose to
invest.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this empirical study, the investor behaviour in 214 small hydropower projects
has been examined. Data from a previous study by Heggedal et al. (2013) has
been extended and updated through interviews with investors (cf. Chapter 4).
The results show that the investor’s expectation to subsidies is dependent on the
applied model and its definition of the optimal decision rule. The two-factor real
options model derived in Chapter 3 predicts that investors on average expected
subsidies in the size of Swedish elcertificates (cf. Section 5.1.1). It also predicts
that investors deferring investment would have required a subsidy larger than
those who invested, displaying rational investment behaviour. Using a now-or-
never investment approach, the NPV model predicts that investors did not expect
subsidies on average (cf. Section 5.1.2). However, results from the investors that
deferred investment show that the NPV decision rule might not be a good de-
scriptor of the investment behaviour, as their NPV was positive in 6 of 12 years
and thus should have invested according to this rule. Furthermore, we find that
the evolution in implied subsidies follows the predicted trend based on publicly
available information published by the government. Thus, our results infer that
the average investor did expect subsidies when he or she invested and behave as
predicted by real options theory.
Based on the quotes in Appendix D we further strengthen our belief that the real
options decision rule is a good descriptor of the investment behaviour, even though
we acknowledge individual differences across investors. A scenario described in
Heggedal et al. (2013) is that professional investors are behaving according to
real options theory, while non-professionals according to NPV. We support their
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findings, but only in the case where the investor chose to invest. Our results
infer that non-professionals deferring investment also behave as predicted by real
options theory.
Appendix A
Calculus
A.1 Proof of Present Value Calculation
Noting that the expectation of a variable following GBM is E[Pt|P0 = P ] = P eαP t
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), we have:
V (P, S) =E
[∫ TP
0
e−rtPtdt+
∫ TS2
TS1
e−rtStdt|P0 = P, S0 = S
]
=E
[∫ TP
0
e−rtPtdt|P0 = P
]
+ E
[∫ TS2
TS1
e−rtStdt|S0 = S
]
=
∫ TP
0
e−rtE[Pt|P0 = P ]dt+
∫ TS2
TS1
e−rtE[St|S0 = S]dt
=
∫ TP
0
e−rtP eαP tdt+
∫ TS2
TS1
e−rtSeαStdt
=P
∫ TP
0
e−(r−αP )tdt+ S
∫ TS2
TS1
e−(r−αS)tdt
=1− e
−(r−αP )TP
r − αP P +
e−(r−αS)TS1 − e−(r−αS)TS2
r − αS S
(A.1)
A.2 Algebra to Find Optimal Investment Point
Rearrange Equation (3.13) c):
(S∗)βS = rP
AβP (P ∗)βP−1
(A.2)
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Insert Equation (A.2) for (S∗)βS in (3.13) b):
A(P ∗)βP
(
rP
AβP (P ∗)βP−1
)
= rPP ∗ + rSS∗ − I (A.3)
⇔ P ∗rP
(
1− βP
βP
)
= rSS∗ − I (A.4)
Solve for A in Equation (3.13) c) and d) and equate them:
βPS
∗
βSP ∗
= rP
rS
⇔ S∗ = rP
rS
βS
βP
P ∗ (A.5)
Insert Equation (A.5) for S∗ in Equation (A.4):
P ∗rP
(
1− βP
βP
)
= rS
(
rP
rS
βS
βP
P ∗
)
− I (A.6)
By rearranging, we then obtain the expression for P ∗:
P ∗ = βP
βP + βS − 1
I
rP
(A.7)
This we can use to find S∗ by inserting it in Equation (A.5):
S∗ = rP
rS
βS
βP
βP
βP + βS − 1
I
rP
= βS
βP + βS − 1
I
rS
(A.8)
A.3 Finding βP , Given the Electricity Price P
Remember the substitution:
βS = βPη(P ) + 1 (A.9)
Insert it in the fundamental quadratic from Equation (3.11):
Q (βP , βPη(P ) + 1) =
1
2(σ
2
PβP (βP − 1) + σ2S(βPη(P ) + 1)((βPη(P ) + 1)− 1)
+2σPσSρβP (βPη(P ) + 1))
+αPβP + αS(βPη(P ) + 1)− r = 0
(A.10)
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Simplify and collect the terms with β2P and βP :
Q (βP , βPη(P ) + 1) =
1
2
(
σ2P + σ2Sη2(P ) + 2σPσSρη(P )
)
β2P
+
(1
2(−σ
2
P + σ2Sη(P ) + 2σPσSρ) + αP + αSη(P )
)
βP
+ (αS − r) = 0
(A.11)
Finally, solve the second-order equation for βP :
βP,1,2 =
−b±√b2 − 4ac
2a (A.12)
where
a = 12
(
σ2P + σ2Sη2(P )
)
+ σPσSρη(P ) (A.13a)
b = 12
(
−σ2P + σ2Sη(P )
)
+ σPσSρ+ αP + αSη(P ) (A.13b)
c = αS − r (A.13c)

Appendix B
Tax on Small Hydropower Plants
The present tax regime has been governing since 1997, although the rates have
been changed a few times. The relevant laws are found in the Taxation Act §18
”Special regulations for hydropower plants” and the Property Tax Act §8B ”Hy-
dropower stations”. For readers interested in the impact of the different tax regimes
on investment, I refer to Hall and Jorgenson (1967) for a broad introduction. More
specifically, Baunsgaard (2001), Lund (2009), McPhail et al. (2009) and Otto et al.
(2006) study how rent taxes may distort firms’ operating and investment decisions.
Frestad (2010) analyses how firms’ financial strategies may be influenced by rent
taxation. Bye and Bruvoll (2008) study the effects of aggregate taxes and subsidies.
The tax on small hydropower plants is a combination of several taxes:
Taxt =Profit Taxt + Property Taxt + Economic Rentt
+Natural Resource Taxt
(B.1)
In addition to the elements in Equation (B.1), hydropower plant owners could
be subject to municipal license fees and concessionary power as well as wealth
tax. These elements are neglected further on due to a low impact on the overall
decision making process. Losses can be carried forward and used in subsequent
years for tax credits, which is incorporated in the calculations through the use
of continuous compounding. We assume that the investor is in a tax position
and can thereby neglect the large investment cost occurring the first year without
affecting the results significantly. We conquer the tax equation by deriving each
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term separately in the following subsections. The final result is:
TaxTP0 =τProfit
rPP + rSS − c0rC − 2.5%I0rR
−rDebt75%I0
(
rR − 5%
r
(
rR − TP e−rTP
))+ τPropertyUpper Limit rR
+τEconomic Rent|R>L
rPP + rSS − c0rC − 2.5%I0rR
−τPropertyUpper Limit rR − rNormI0
(
rR − 2.5%
r
(
rR − TP e−rTP
))
(B.2)
where
rC =
(
1− e−(r−i)TP
r − i
)
, rR =
(
1− e−rTP
r
)
(B.3)
B.1 Profit Tax
The first term is the profit tax. The profit tax is calculated as 28% of revenue after
costs and interests are paid, commonly known as earnings before taxes (EBT):
Profit Taxt =τProfit[Revenuet − (Maintenance Costt
+Amortization and Depreciationt + Interest Costst)]
(B.4)
The formulas for revenue and maintenance cost has already been derived in Chap-
ter 3. Hydropower plants are subject to a linear amortization and depreciation
over approximately 40 years. Machine-oriented equipment should be depreciated
over 40 years, while pipes, dams, gates and power stations should be depreciated
over 67 years (cf. Taxation Act §18-6). Based on conversations with NTE we
estimate that 22% of the investment cost relates to pipes, gates and digging, while
75% relates to the actual power plant:
Amortization and Depreciationt
=
(
22% I067 + 75%
I0
40 + 3%(5% Balance Depreciation)
)
≈ I040 = 2.5%I0
(B.5)
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Interest costs is a fixed proportion of the remaining loan balance, depending on
the loan interest rate rDebt. In the small hydropower industry it is common to loan
75% of the investment cost, I0. For simplicity we assume that the loan is a series
loan, with equal down payments and duration of 20 years.
Down Paymentt = 5%Loan Balance0 = 5%75%I0 (B.6)
Interest Costt = rDebtLoan Balancet = rDebt75%I0(1− 5%t) (B.7)
Now we can evaluate the profit tax in equation (B.4) with respect to the whole
lifetime of the power plant.
Profit TaxTP0 =τProfit
P ∫ TP
0
e−(r−αP )tdt+ S
∫ TS2
TS1
e−(r−αS)tdt
−
∫ TP
0
c0e−(r−i)tdt−
∫ TP
0
2.5%I0e−rtdt
−
∫ TP
0
rDebt75%I0(1− 5%t)e−rtdt

(B.8)
After solving the integrals and using partial integration we get:
Profit TaxTP0 =τProfit
rPP + rSS − c0rC − 2.5%I0rR
−rDebt75%I0
(
rR − 5%
r
(
rR − TP e−rTP
)) (B.9)
B.2 Property Tax
The second term in the tax equation (B.1) is the property tax. The property tax
is paid in addition to the income tax. It is voluntarily for the municipalities if they
want to collect property tax, and they can choose a rate, τProperty, between 0.2%
and 0.7%. The rate is multiplied by the market value in each year (cf. Property
Tax Act §8B). For simplicity we assume that the investment cost is the market
value. The market value is assumed to decrease over the years, and we apply the
same linear depreciation as explained above.
Property Taxt = τPropertyMarket V aluet (B.10)
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The market value decreases approximately linearly over 40 years.
Market V aluet = I0(1− 2.5%t) (B.11)
Over the lifetime over the power plant:
Property TaxTP0 =τProperty
(∫ TP
0
I0(1− 2.5%t)e−rtdt
)
=τPropertyI0
(
rR − 2.5%
r
(
rR − TP e−rTP
)) (B.12)
From 2004 the government introduced a maximum market value, Upper Limitt,
for power plants (cf. Property Tax Act §8B-1 (4)). The boundary was from 2004
including 2011 2.35 NOK/kWh/y (∼290 e/MWh/y) multiplied by the average
annual production over the current and the past six years 1. If the plant has been
running for less than six years, then these years are used to calculate the average.
In 2012 it was adjusted to 2.47 NOK/kWh/y (∼330 e/MWh/y). Most new power
plants find themselves above this upper boundary, on the average 4 NOK/kWh/y
(∼500 EUR/MWh/y)(Advokatfimaet Lund & Co DA, 2012). Additionally, there
is a minimum boundary of 0.95 NOK/kWh/y (∼120 e/MWh/y), also present
prior to 2004 and kept constant through the years. A simplifying approach could
therefore be to assume that the power plant owners pay the maximum property
tax over the whole lifetime.
Property TaxTP0 =τProperty
∫ TP
0
Upper Limitte−rtdt
=τPropertyUpper Limit rR
(B.13)
B.3 Economic Rent
The third term in the tax equation (B.1) is the tax on economic rent. It is
designed to tax super profits and only applicable to power plants ≥ 5.5MVA
(cf. Taxation Act §18-3). This limit was raised from ≥ 1.5MVA in 2004 and
temporarily lowered back to this level in 2008. As the temporarily lowering was
reversed quickly and only lasted for a few months Ministry of Finance (2008), we
have chosen to omit this in the calculations. The economic rent τEconomicRent|R>L
1Prior to 2008 the basis was not the average annual production over the current and past six
years, but the same basis used to calculate the natural resource tax
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currently equals 30%. Prior to 2008 this rate was 27% (Ministry of Finance, 2007).
It comes on top of the profit tax, making the total tax rate on revenue 58%.
The basis for the tax on economic rent is the normal market value of production
subtracted maintenance cost, amortization and depreciation and property tax. In
addition, one can subtract free income to make sure that normal profits below
super profits are not taxed. The free income is calculated as the average book
value on 1st Jan and 31st Dec multiplied by a prescribed norm rent, rNorm. The
norm rent is set by the Parliament each year in arrears based on Treasury Bills’
trading history. A table of the historical norm rent is included in Chapter 4.
Free Incomet = rNormBook V alue (t−dt)+t
2
= rNormI0(1− 2.5%t) (B.14)
Economic Rentt = τEconomicRent|R>L[Revenuet − (Maintenance Costt
+ Amortization and Depreciationt + Property Taxt
+Free Incomet)]
(B.15)
Over the whole lifetime of the power plant it is:
Economic RentTP0 =τEconomicRent|R>L
[
P
∫ TP
0
e−(r−αP )tdt+ S
∫ TS2
TS1
e−(r−αS)tdt
−
∫ TP
0
c0e−(r−i)tdt−
∫ TP
0
2.5%I0e−rtdt
−τProperty
∫ TP
0
Upper Limitte−rtdt
−
∫ TP
0
rNormI0(1− 2.5%t)e−rtdt
]
(B.16)
And finally, by solving the integrals:
Economic RentTP0 =τEconomicRent|R>L
rPP + rSS − c0rC − 2.5%I0rR
−τPropertyUpper Limit rR
−rNormI0
(
rR − 2.5%
r
(
rR − TP e−rTP
))
(B.17)
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B.4 Natural Resource Tax
The fourth term in the tax equation (B.1) is the natural resource tax. As for
the tax on economic rent, it is only applicable for power plants ≥ 5.5MVA (cf.
Taxation act §18-2). The rate is 1.625 e/MWh multiplied by the average annual
production over the current and the past six years. The natural resource tax is
coordinated with the income tax, such that an investor will never pay more than
28% of income tax and natural resource tax altogether. By assuming that the
investors pay full income taxes we can omit this tax in the calculations.
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Appendix D
Quotes From the Survey
• ”Given that we invested in a plant above 1MW, we did not think that the
elcertificates would be applicable for us. But we were hoping they would
come.” – Decided to invest in 2005
• ”Yes, our project was only marginally profitable without elcertificates.” –
Decided to invest in 2010, license was given in 2004.
• ”Of course elcertificates are of good help” – Mini power plant built in 2005
• ”Promises of elcertificates made us revitalize the project.” ”Our expectations
to elcertificates are at 20 e/MWh. We have included this in our calcula-
tions.” ”We have evaluated the profitability through NPV of cash flows to
equity and to total capital.” – Considering investing in 2013
• ”It was a big disappointment. We were sure we would receive elcertificates.”
– Started production in 2009
• ”We did not manage to become a part of the scheme. But it was not included
in our calculations either.” – Decided to invest in 2006
• ”With current power prices and the developing trend it is absolutely crucial
for the profitability that we receive elcertificates. Without them the project
will not be profitable.” ”It was a big disappointment that we did not receive
elcertificates on that power plant.” – Investor owning several licenses, decided
to invest in one of them in 2007
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• ”In the beginning we were very sceptical. It sounded great, but we will see. It
could be that prices drop when many receives certificates.” ”We are situated
within the NO5 area where power prices are low. It is therefore vital for us
that we receive certificates.” – Decided to invest in 2010, license was given in
2007
• ”We have been waiting for the elcertificates. We are hoping for a price of 20
e/MWh and have included this in our calculations.” – Currently waiting for
answer on an application to the regulators about amendments
• ”We started production without even considering revenue from elcertificates.
We have economy to manage without.” – Decided to invest in 2009, license
was given 2007
• ”We did not dare to believe in revenue from elcertificates. We have spread-
sheets with and without this in the calculations.” ”We set a roof on the in-
vestment at 470 e/MWh/y.” – Decided to invest in 2007
• ”We expected to receive elcertificates given promises that everyone who in-
vested after 2004 would receive support, but we did not take it into account
in expected revenues. Do never trust political promises.” – Decided to invest
in 2007
• ”Elcertificates have saved much of our bottom line economy.” ”We presented
a scenario 1 and a scenario 2 to the banks.” ”Cash flow to equity was the most
important analysis, but we also performed an NPV analysis.” ”We have been
approved for elcertificates since late 2012 and signed a hedging agreement for
the certificates for 3 years with a trading company.” – Decided to invest in
2008, started production in 2011.
• ”We were very cynical. We said that elcertificates, they don’t exist, until it is
actually implemented.” ”We expect a price of 20 e/MWh and have used this
in our calculations.” ”We know several who invested already in 2004 based
on the promises expecting 25 e/MWh. Some of them are on the edge of
bankruptcy. It is of course a big disappointment when you expected to re-
ceive close to e4 million (25 e/MWh · 10 GWh/year = e0.25 million/year,
multiplied by 15 years = e3.75 million).” ”When we evaluate the profitability
in a project we use the expected annual production as a base, then we find
the return and compare this to our requirements. If it pays off, we invest. It
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is self-explanatory that no years equal the average, and the profitability will
be poorer some years and better other years, but over a period of 10 years it
will average out.” – Decided to invest in 2012, received license in 2008
• ”It is a clear goal for us to invest soon so we can enter the scheme.” –
Investor currently delayed by transmission capacity
• ”Elcertificates was a prerequisite for our investment. We would not have
invested without it.” ”We could have started the building one year earlier,
but we chose to wait for the elcertificates and spent more time on detailed
planning. It is important to acknowledge that a hydropower plant is a long
term investment.” – Decided to invest in 2012
• ”None of our projects included revenue from elcertificates before they were
implemented.” – Owner of several licenses
• ”If it wasn’t for the elcertificates we would not have decided to invest in the
power plant.” – Decided to invest in 2011
• ”We have been waiting for elcertificates. We see now that with current power
prices we would not have managed without. It makes a huge difference.” –
Started building in 2010, received license 2008
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